The issuance and implementation of China's *Interim Measures for the Management of Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) / Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP)-Based Payment in Healthcare Security* marks a shift from the traditional fee-for-service model to a diagnosis-based point payment system in China. The DIP payment mechanism, which operates on an average-cost basis, effectively controls unreasonable expenses during diagnosis and treatment, enhances the efficiency of healthcare fund utilization, and accelerates the transformation of the medical system from a "disease-centered" to a "health-centered" approach. This reform will inevitably influence physicians' clinical behavior. The stethoscope and scalpel in doctors' hands are now imbued with new meanings, compelling physicians to evolve from purely technical experts into prudent "medico-economic stewards," who must closely align patient needs with healthcare payment requirements. This article examines the changes in physician behavior under the DRG/DIP payment reform from three perspectives: the shift from revenue management to cost management, reflecting a precise reorientation in clinical practice; the deep restructuring of decision-making mechanisms from a technology-driven to a value-driven approach; and the comprehensive expansion of the physician’s role from merely responding to patient demands to proactively managing care needs. It concludes that, leveraged by the payment model reform, the transformation in physician behavior will in turn shape new service models and herald the dawn of a new era in healthcare services.
| Published in | Science Discovery (Volume 13, Issue 6) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21 |
| Page(s) | 170-174 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Science Publishing Group |
DRG/DIP, Payment Reform, Doctor Behavior, Characteristics of Change
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APA Style
Hongjun, L., Yi, W., Hong, C. (2025). The Manifestation Characteristics of Doctors' Behavioral Changes Under the DRG/DIP Payment Reform. Science Discovery, 13(6), 170-174. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21
ACS Style
Hongjun, L.; Yi, W.; Hong, C. The Manifestation Characteristics of Doctors' Behavioral Changes Under the DRG/DIP Payment Reform. Sci. Discov. 2025, 13(6), 170-174. doi: 10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21
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Download@article{10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21,
author = {Li Hongjun and Wang Yi and Cao Hong},
title = {The Manifestation Characteristics of Doctors' Behavioral Changes Under the DRG/DIP Payment Reform
},
journal = {Science Discovery},
volume = {13},
number = {6},
pages = {170-174},
doi = {10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.sd.20251306.21},
abstract = {The issuance and implementation of China's *Interim Measures for the Management of Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) / Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP)-Based Payment in Healthcare Security* marks a shift from the traditional fee-for-service model to a diagnosis-based point payment system in China. The DIP payment mechanism, which operates on an average-cost basis, effectively controls unreasonable expenses during diagnosis and treatment, enhances the efficiency of healthcare fund utilization, and accelerates the transformation of the medical system from a "disease-centered" to a "health-centered" approach. This reform will inevitably influence physicians' clinical behavior. The stethoscope and scalpel in doctors' hands are now imbued with new meanings, compelling physicians to evolve from purely technical experts into prudent "medico-economic stewards," who must closely align patient needs with healthcare payment requirements. This article examines the changes in physician behavior under the DRG/DIP payment reform from three perspectives: the shift from revenue management to cost management, reflecting a precise reorientation in clinical practice; the deep restructuring of decision-making mechanisms from a technology-driven to a value-driven approach; and the comprehensive expansion of the physician’s role from merely responding to patient demands to proactively managing care needs. It concludes that, leveraged by the payment model reform, the transformation in physician behavior will in turn shape new service models and herald the dawn of a new era in healthcare services.
},
year = {2025}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - The Manifestation Characteristics of Doctors' Behavioral Changes Under the DRG/DIP Payment Reform AU - Li Hongjun AU - Wang Yi AU - Cao Hong Y1 - 2025/12/29 PY - 2025 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21 DO - 10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21 T2 - Science Discovery JF - Science Discovery JO - Science Discovery SP - 170 EP - 174 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2331-0650 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sd.20251306.21 AB - The issuance and implementation of China's *Interim Measures for the Management of Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) / Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP)-Based Payment in Healthcare Security* marks a shift from the traditional fee-for-service model to a diagnosis-based point payment system in China. The DIP payment mechanism, which operates on an average-cost basis, effectively controls unreasonable expenses during diagnosis and treatment, enhances the efficiency of healthcare fund utilization, and accelerates the transformation of the medical system from a "disease-centered" to a "health-centered" approach. This reform will inevitably influence physicians' clinical behavior. The stethoscope and scalpel in doctors' hands are now imbued with new meanings, compelling physicians to evolve from purely technical experts into prudent "medico-economic stewards," who must closely align patient needs with healthcare payment requirements. This article examines the changes in physician behavior under the DRG/DIP payment reform from three perspectives: the shift from revenue management to cost management, reflecting a precise reorientation in clinical practice; the deep restructuring of decision-making mechanisms from a technology-driven to a value-driven approach; and the comprehensive expansion of the physician’s role from merely responding to patient demands to proactively managing care needs. It concludes that, leveraged by the payment model reform, the transformation in physician behavior will in turn shape new service models and herald the dawn of a new era in healthcare services. VL - 13 IS - 6 ER -
Chengdu Xinhua Hospital Affiliated to North Sichuan Medical College, Chengdu, China
Chengdu Xinhua Hospital Affiliated to North Sichuan Medical College, Chengdu, China
Chengdu Xinhua Hospital Affiliated to North Sichuan Medical College, Chengdu, China
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