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Research Article | | Peer-Reviewed

Research on Structural Optimization of China’s Maritime Accident Investigation

Wu Songyu,  Du Jiaqi,  Hou Meixiang,  Wu Changyue*
Published in Journal of Public Policy and Administration (Volume 10, Issue 2)
Received: 27 February 2026     Accepted: 14 March 2026     Published: 30 March 2026
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Abstract

The central contradiction that maritime accident investigations aim to resolve has shifted from establishing a closed chain of evidence to authentically reconstructing the truth of accidents. At present, maritime accident investigations in China are still dominated by a value orientation of accountability attribution, lacking a genuine people?centered approach and insufficiently reconciling the interests of multiple stakeholders. The mechanized investigation procedures carried out by a single administrative authority often incomplete and one?sided factual findings, which not only impede the formulation of effective preventive measures but also fail to fully protect the legitimate rights and interests of the parties concerned. Based on advanced international experience, investigations should be guided by the core principles of ex?ante prevention, integrity incentives, and collaborative governance. It is proposed that an independent maritime accident investigation agency, separate from the Maritime Safety Administration, be established. This agency shall conduct a comprehensive investigation into all contributing factors of maritime accidents, put forward targeted safety recommendations, supervise their implementation, and conduct credit assessments of relevant parties. Such credit assessments shall directly influence the final administrative decisions issued by the Maritime Safety Administration, so as to reshape the institutional power system of maritime accident investigations through a dual?subject structure.

Published in Journal of Public Policy and Administration (Volume 10, Issue 2)
DOI 10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12
Page(s) 155-167
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Science Publishing Group
Previous article
Keywords

Maritime Accident Investigation, Administrative Investigation, Risk Prevention, Credit Assessment

1. Introduction
In recent years, maritime accidents have shown a trend of frequent occurrence and complex risk factors. Taking China as an example, in 2024, there were 66 transport vessel water traffic incidents of a certain severity level, resulting in 63 fatalities or missing persons and 15 sunken vessels
[1]
. Although this represents a decrease compared to the 89 incidents and 78 fatalities/missing persons in 2023
[2]
, the overall risk pressure remains significant. Globally, 3310”shipping casualties or incidents” were reported in 2024, an increase of approximately 10% from 2,963 in 2023. Among these, the proportion of events such as machinery damage, fires, and explosions rose. While the number of total losses of large vessels dropped to a record low of 27, the overall volume of incidents remains high
[3]
. This indicates that with the growth of international shipping volume and the deepening trends of vessel gigantism and diversification, the complexity, suddenness, and externalities of maritime accidents are becoming increasingly prominent.
As the Maritime Power Strategy accelerates, reducing maritime accidents is an inevitable requirement for improving the efficiency of ocean development and utilization. Maritime administrative law enforcement is a crucial safeguard mechanism and key means for maintaining maritime safety and promoting the development of maritime affairs. As an important function of maritime administrative authorities, maritime accident investigation directly impacts the final disposition of accidents. Currently, academic debates surrounding maritime accident investigation persist, with core disputes focusing on whether investigation reports constitute factual evidence or administrative acts,
[4]
and the nature of investigative actions
[5]
. However, regardless of the debate, they fail to address the fundamental pain point that maritime accident investigation struggles to reconstruct the truth of accidents, offering little direct benefit for the protection of parties' rights or the prevention of future accidents. Particularly compared to land-based accidents, maritime accidents have more complex causes, making it more difficult to fully reconstruct the complete picture. On one hand, maritime accidents are significantly influenced by complex environmental factors at sea, often resulting from the superposition of natural disasters, technical defects, and human error, exhibiting strong systemic and unpredictable characteristics that make objective factors difficult to reconstruct. On the other hand, collecting evidence for maritime accidents is relatively challenging, and crew members, under significant psychological pressure and facing heavy legal liability, may be insufficiently cooperative, making subjective factors difficult to verify. With the expansion and transformation of administrative tasks, traditional high-authority administration has waned. The goals of administrative power have begun to shift from the singular maintenance of order towards balancing multiple values. Service-oriented administration and risk administration are gradually becoming the core paradigms and direction of transformation in administrative law. Maritime accident investigation should also shift its mindset towards serving seafarers and preventing the recurrence of accidents. It should establish a mechanism separating fact-finding from liability determination under a system of checks and balances to meet the practical needs of maritime accident prevention.
2. Critical Reflection on Issues in Maritime Accident Investigation
A holistic examination of the normative system and enforcement practices of maritime accident investigation reveals that, whether under the Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter “Maritime Traffic Safety Law”) revised in 2021 or the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Investigation and Handling of Maritime Traffic Accidents (hereinafter “Maritime Accident Investigation Regulations”) promulgated in 1990, the investigation still adheres to the underlying logic of traditional administrative management. That is, a single administrative authority is responsible for both investigating facts and making final disposition decisions. While this model has, to some extent, ensured the authority of investigative work, with the expansion of shipping scale and increased international cooperation, it has become disconnected from international rules, exhibiting certain lagging aspects in both philosophy and institutional design, leading to functional deviation.
2.1. Philosophical Lag
The philosophy of maritime accident investigation has failed to keep pace with the evolution of the shipping safety risk landscape. Its value orientation and institutional logic conflict to some extent with the scientific and independent nature required for modern accident investigation. This lag not only weakens the accident prevention and safety assurance functions that the investigation system should inherently perform but also creates significant limitations at the level of rule-making, necessitating reflection and improvement.
2.1.1. Punitive Philosophy Weakens Accident Prevention Function
The institutional design and practical logic of China's current maritime accident investigation exhibit a punitive orientation,
[6]
emphasizing deterrence against future accidents through accountability and sanctions imposed on parties and responsible entities
[7]
. When the investigative purpose is overly focused on identifying the party at fault, the fact-finding in investigation reports often serves liability determination. This leads to the neglect of analyzing technical defects, management loopholes, and institutional risks, making it difficult to form effective systemic preventive recommendations
[8]
. Simultaneously, the punitive orientation fosters a defensive attitude among crew members and responsible parties, who tend to conceal the true situation or provide selective statements to avoid legal liability, further undermining the objectivity and comprehensiveness of the investigation. This creates a gap with the internationally recognized objective of “preventing future maritime accidents and maritime incidents.” It not only affects the scientific and independent nature of investigations but also constrains the institutional value of investigative outcomes in accident prevention, industry governance, and policy improvement, thereby deviating the investigation from its fundamental mission.
2.1.2. Lack of a “People-Centered” Investigative Philosophy
At the philosophical level, the current maritime accident investigation system generally neglects the “human” element. It fails to implement the value of “life first, safety first,”
[9]
and does not sufficiently consider the psychological, behavioral, and physiological factors of crew members and relevant personnel during the accident process. The genesis of violations, the establishment of unlawful intent, and the formation of accidents are all results of actors' free will choices
[10]
. The lack of a people-centered philosophy means investigations often remain at the level of tracing objective facts and attributing liability, failing to delve into the deep-seated human factors behind accidents. On one hand, the unique working environment of seafarers—long hours of high-intensity labor, cross-cultural communication barriers, occupational stress, and mental health issues—can play a key role in accident causation
[11]
. However, current investigations primarily focus on discovering objective problems, lacking sufficient attention to the agency of individuals, which significantly diminishes the preventive and improvement value of investigation results. On the other hand, the absence of a humanistic philosophy weakens the credibility of accident investigations. Neglecting the protection of seafarers' legitimate rights, mental state, and professional security easily breeds resistance or even antagonism among investigation subjects, affecting the completeness and authenticity of information collection
[12]
.
2.1.3. Neglect of Multi-Party Interest Reconciliation
Maritime accident investigation is not merely a technical activity of fact-finding and liability determination; it is also a governance process involving multiple stakeholders and complex interests. However, current investigative practices, both in philosophy and institutional design, pay insufficient attention to balancing and reconciling these diverse interests,
[13]
leading to investigation outcomes that often struggle to achieve comprehensive fairness and broad acceptance, subsequently triggering disputes. The dominance of administrative authorities over the investigative procedure naturally skews the process towards upholding administrative responsibility and industry order. Investigation results with this liability-oriented focus often find it difficult to balance the accountability-avoidance demands of responsible parties, the right-to-remedy demands of victims, the exoneration demands of insurance institutions, and the compensation claims of environmental protection departments, rendering the final outcomes unsatisfactory. Given the high evidentiary weight accorded to maritime investigation results,
[14]
neglecting multi-party interest reconciliation inevitably weakens their inclusiveness and, to some extent, undermines the credibility of administrative authorities.
2.2. Single Authority
Maritime accident investigation should rely on the division of labor and collaboration among multiple entities to ensure the objectivity of fact-finding. However, the configuration of investigative authorities in China remains highly centralized, failing to reflect multi-level, multi-perspective professional differentiation
[6]
. This structural flaw directly impacts the independence and comprehensiveness of investigations, posing an urgent demand for subsequent institutional optimization.
2.2.1. Role Conflation
Currently, the powers of maritime accident investigation and disposition in China belong to the same administrative body, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA)
[15]
. While this centralized model of integrated investigation and punishment offers institutional advantages in terms of authority and efficiency, it also possesses significant structural drawbacks.
On one hand, the single-authority investigative structure easily leads to role conflict in practice, facing the issue of conflating the roles of investigator, regulator, and even party related to the accident. This objectively casts doubt on the independence and credibility of the investigation. On the other hand, accident investigation conducted from an administrative management standpoint is a procedural step for administrative agencies in handling maritime accidents. In the absence of checks and balances from other power entities, this investigative action, which is a decisive factor for the final disposition, severely lacks neutrality.
2.2.2. Single Perspective
Current investigations are mostly led by administrative competent authorities, whose focus is often on the division of legal liabilities, the maintenance of administrative order, and the effectiveness of policy implementation. This manager’s perspective lacks comprehensive and in-depth analysis of technical defects, industry practices, crew psychology and behavioral factors, and even cross-border legal conflicts involved in the accident, resulting in investigation reports that often have more space for institutional evaluation and punishment recommendations, but are insufficient in terms of risk chain reconstruction and preventive measure design
[16]
.
The investigation process ignores multiple opinions and tends to have a single perspective, making it difficult to form a panoramic understanding of the accident causes and risk chain, and also difficult to provide operable improvement plans for shipping enterprises, let alone respond to the reasonable concerns of crew groups, insurance institutions, environmental protection organizations, and other parties. When the investigation perspective is long-term limited to administrative liability and industry order, the core concerns of other stakeholders are easily marginalized, thereby weakening the comprehensive effectiveness of accident investigations in public governance.
2.3. Incomplete Facts
At present, maritime accident investigations focus on the announcement of conclusions, failing to provide support for subsequent institutional improvement and risk prevention and control through comprehensive and accurate fact reconstruction. The collection and presentation of accident facts have obvious defects, making it difficult to achieve the required completeness and scientificity. This problem is neither an isolated technical deficiency nor a mere procedural flaw, but a concentrated reflection of in-depth institutional orientation and methodological limitations. In this sense, discussing the incompleteness at the factual level is independently important.
2.3.1. Fact Fragmentation Under the Liability Orientation
In current maritime accident investigations, liability determination is often placed at the core, and the primary goal of investigation work is to clarify liability attribution to provide a basis for administrative penalties, civil compensation, and even criminal accountability, which is pre-determinative
[17]
. This logical starting point of finding fault has an obvious retributive accountability tendency, limiting the breadth and depth of fact-finding
[18]
. Specifically, the selection of investigation evidence revolves around liable subjects, and facts related to accident mechanisms and risk management systems but not directly pointing to legal liability are marginalized; investigation inquiries and report writing follow the logical order of the liability attribution chain, progressing from direct liability to indirect liability, while rarely investigating the more complex systemic hidden dangers behind the accident. This approach leads to a kind of “administrative tailoring” of case facts, directly resulting in the functional imbalance of investigation results. That is, although the investigation report can quickly support administrative penalties or civil compensation, its reference value in accident prevention, industry governance, and institutional improvement is obviously insufficient. In other words, the investigation facts under the liability orientation are instrumentalized as an auxiliary to the law enforcement process, failing to independently assume the institutional mission of revealing risk chains and providing preventive recommendations.
2.3.2. Lack of Subjective Factors
Existing maritime accident investigations mostly rely on objective evidence such as physical evidence and operation records, lacking systematic research on the psychological reactions, risk perception, and decision-making logic of accident parties, and generally ignoring in-depth analysis of the psychological states and behavioral patterns of crew members and relevant personnel.
Under this investigation model, crew members provide testimonies under pressure, and their narratives may be evasive or selective for self-protection, leading to a serious lack of information at the psychological and behavioral levels. In the absence of the involvement of multidisciplinary methods such as psychology and cognitive science, investigation results can only describe “superficial operational errors,”making it difficult to reveal the in-depth individual psychological mechanisms and corporate organizational culture that lead to these errors. Investigation reports lacking subjective psychological and behavioral factors have insufficient explanatory power, and the obtained facts are incomplete, making it difficult to provide substantive support for subsequent institutional improvement and training mechanisms
[19]
.
2.3.3. Lack of Preventive Recommendations
The investigation facts are difficult to generate conclusions with real preventive value, only staying at the reconstruction of the current situation of the already occurred accident, failing to extend to the prevention of potential risks, and the conclusions lack an effective feedback mechanism at the institutional level. Since preventive recommendations are not the core goal of the investigation, the safety management recommendations proposed in the report are often too general, lacking pertinence and operability
[20]
. This not only makes it difficult for the investigation to promote the improvement of industry safety standards but also weakens the risk prevention function of the investigation results.
2.4. Procedural Impropriety
Procedural defects further undermine the legitimacy and credibility of maritime accident investigations. As a form of power operation combining administrative and quasi-judicial nature
[21]
, the standardization of accident investigations largely depends on the reasonable design and strict implementation of procedures. However, current investigation procedures often become formalized and stylized in practice, which not only makes it difficult to achieve the institutional purposes of fact-finding and prevention but also leaves obvious loopholes in the protection and remedy of rights.
2.4.1. Mechanized Investigation Procedures
Current maritime accident investigations generally show mechanistic characteristics in procedural operation. Investigation authorities mostly carry out their work relying on established procedural templates, focusing on formal compliance and step completeness, while paying insufficient attention to whether the procedures can achieve the investigation purposes or respond to actual needs.
From the initiation of the procedure, evidence collection to report writing, all strictly follow a fixed model, lacking flexible adjustments according to the type of accident, environmental conditions, and subject differences, making the investigation work complete in form but difficult to achieve in-depth reconstruction of the accident truth in essence
[22]
. Investigators are accustomed to implementing each item in accordance with legal provisions and report templates, and are unwilling to break through to explore atypical facts or new risks associated with the accident. This inertia makes the investigation results highly homogenized, mostly staying at conventional descriptions and liability division, lacking targeted preventive recommendations, and ignoring the particularity and complexity of the accident
[23]
.
In addition, the mechanistic tendency of procedures weakens the dynamic adaptability of the investigation system. With the development of ship upsizing and intelligence, the occurrence mechanism of new types of accidents has become increasingly complex, but the investigation procedures still follow the traditional logic of evidence collection and liability determination, making it difficult to integrate modern technical means and interdisciplinary perspectives. This not only directly leads to investigation conclusions that are difficult to meet the public’s expectations for truth and safety improvement but also weakens China’s right to speak in international cooperation and institutional innovation in maritime accident investigations.
2.4.2. Insufficient Protection of the Parties’ Rights
Maritime accident investigations are a process of fact-finding and liability determination, which have a significant impact on the rights of accident parties and relevant subjects. At present, maritime accident investigations emphasize the maintenance of administrative order. The counterpart is in a passive position in the investigation procedure, lacking effective protection of procedural participation rights and channels for equal communication with the investigation authority to weaken confrontation, resulting in an institutional paradox where maritime accident investigations have complete procedural forms but substantial absence of rights protection
[24]
.
On the one hand, under the liability-oriented premise, the parties have an estimated judgment on the direction of the investigation procedure and the legal consequences of statements and defenses. In this case, the parties generally tend to make statements conducive to avoiding liability, which essentially weakens the protection of the parties’ right to statement. On the other hand, the parties have poor channels for feedback on expert opinions and investigation views, making it difficult to achieve effective defense. Given the high evidential effect of investigation conclusions, insufficient protection of the parties’ right to defense violates the requirement of procedural due process and impairs its legality and credibility.
3. Optimization Approaches for Maritime Accident Investigations
With the development of technology, it has become relatively simple to restore the objective factors at the time of the maritime accident, and it has become technically possible to explore the subjective factors of the accident. Fully reconstructing the truth of the accident has become an urgent need for maritime accident investigations. Only by fully reconstructing the truth of the accident can reference experience be provided to avoid the recurrence of accidents, and the preventive role of maritime accident investigations can be fully exerted.
3.1. Experience Reference
International rules and practices of various countries provide many reference experiences for the optimization of China’s maritime accident investigations. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Maritime Accident or Marine Incident (hereinafter referred to as the Accident Investigation Code) in 2008, establishing an institutional orientation centered on “fact-finding and safety improvement.”It clearly emphasizes that the purpose of accident investigation is not to attribute liability, but to propose preventive recommendations through systematic analysis of accident causes, and clarifies the principles such as the purpose, independence, and cooperation of maritime accident investigations in Chapter 16. The establishment of these concepts provides an international legal normative reference for countries to promote the independence and professionalism of investigation systems, and also highlights the value orientation of safety priority in institutional design.
In terms of specific national practices, the U.S. model is representative. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is independent of the administrative law enforcement system, and its investigation purpose focuses on identifying accident causes and proposing safety recommendations, without involving liability attribution
[25]
. This institutional design effectively avoids the institutional drawbacks of the integration of investigation and punishment subjects, makes the investigation more scientific and impartial, and ensures a higher degree of cooperation from the parties, further enhancing the credibility of the investigation conclusions. At the regional cooperation level, the European Union has established a unified framework for accident investigation and information sharing among member states, requiring each country to set up an independent investigation body, conduct cross-border cooperation on major accidents, and clearly stipulate that “investigation conclusions and safety recommendations shall not determine liability or divide liability under any circumstances”
[26]
. This not only avoids the division of conclusions but also promotes the dissemination and application of investigation results in a wider range.
Therefore, under the guidance of the safety-oriented investigation concept, promoting the independence and professionalism of investigation subjects, and strengthening cross-departmental and cross-border information sharing and institutional cooperation are the inevitable requirements for aligning China’s maritime accident investigation system with international standards, and have important reference significance for constructing an optimization path of accident investigation that meets China’s local needs.
3.2. Core Principles
Optimizing maritime accident investigations should first eliminate the punitive-oriented heavy penalty concept and form a paradigm shift centered on modern governance requirements such as ex ante prevention, integrity-based incentives, and collaborative governance.
3.2.1. Ex Ante Prevention
The primary goal of maritime accident investigations should not only be to clarify liability and handle post-accident matters but also to serve risk prevention and institutional improvement at a deeper level. When adopting risk prevention measures, sufficient reasons should be provided, and timely feedback and adjustments should be made according to the occurrence of the accident to improve the acceptability of risk prevention
[27]
.
From the perspective of practical paths, ex ante prevention requires comprehensive consideration of all factors leading to the accident, not only revealing the direct causes of the accident but also in-depth exploration of indirect causes such as institutional defects and potential risks, and fully focusing on the mental health, training mechanisms, working conditions of crew members with operational errors, and whether there are systemic loopholes in the ship management system. From the perspective of effect pursuit, ex ante prevention serves to improve the overall safety level of the industry and enhance the credibility of the investigation system. By providing specific and operable improvement recommendations for industry management departments and shipping enterprises, promote the integration of investigation results into policy standard formulation and safety supervision practices to achieve the ultimate effect of minimizing damage.
When investigations are regarded as an important link in preventing future accidents rather than a mere punitive tool, crew members and enterprises are more willing to cooperate with investigations and provide true and complete information, thereby improving the objectivity and scientificity of investigation results. This not only strengthens the public value of the investigation system but also promotes the transformation of maritime accident investigations towards a modern risk governance model.
3.2.2. Integrity-Based Incentives
In maritime accident investigations, obtaining true and complete factual information is the key to determining the quality of the investigation. Integrity-based incentives are the core of breaking the punitive-oriented investigation concept and promoting the reconstruction of the accident truth. The integrity-based incentive mechanism is an inherent requirement of the modernization of national governance capacity, which can enhance the credibility of the investigation system, make accident investigations a process of jointly seeking the truth rather than a one-sided liability attribution. It not only helps to improve the scientificity and authority of investigation results but also gradually cultivate a cultural atmosphere of exchanging integrity for safety within the industry, laying a foundation for the long-term mechanism of shipping safety
[28]
.
At the institutional level, the concept of integrity-based incentives has dual requirements of weakening punishment and positive incentives. Among them, weakening punishment means trying to avoid directly using investigation results as the sole basis for liability attribution, reducing the parties’ concerns about truthful statements, thereby gaining higher factual transparency; positive incentives mean through institutionalized incentive measures, reducing the adverse consequences that the parties should bear when they truthfully state and actively cooperate with the investigation, and even giving credit points to units with good performance, thereby forming an institutionalized motivation for honest disclosure. At the effect level, integrity-based incentives can give full play to the value of credit and achieve the minimization of losses. Integrity-based incentives can not only minimize the losses of the parties after the accident by reducing legal liability but also promote the reconstruction of the accident truth, avoid the recurrence of similar accidents, and achieve the minimization of future losses.
3.2.3. Collaborative Governance
Collaborative governance is a governance paradigm of a service-oriented government, which requires optimizing social governance resources, providing high-quality social services, and forming a positive interaction between rule of virtue and rule of law
[29]
. Maritime accident investigations are essentially a process of preventing and governing maritime accident risks, involving multiple stakeholders such as crew members, shipowners, insurance companies, environmental protection organizations, and government regulatory departments. In order to achieve effective governance of maritime accidents, the concept of collaborative governance is the best tool to abandon conflicts among various subjects
[30]
.
At the domestic level, collaborative governance means breaking the situation of absolute authority and promoting the formation of a cooperative model involving multiple participants such as administrative organs, judicial organs, and social organizations. Externally, by introducing evaluation systems of experts and technologies in different fields, integrate multi-dimensional perspectives such as technology, management, and psychology in the investigation to avoid fact fragmentation and content homogenization. Moreover, in the final results, expert opinions from different fields should be comprehensively adopted, and reasons should be promptly explained for the unadopted parts, so as to improve the scientificity of the investigation conclusions and increase the public’s trust in the investigation results. Internally, actively mobilize the participation of the investigated objects, and improve the cooperation of the investigated objects through a combination of rigid and flexible systems and rewards and punishments. At the international level, promote the mutual recognition and application of accident investigation results worldwide by establishing cross-border investigation cooperation and information sharing mechanisms.
3.3. Dual-Authority Structure
As a power that directly affects the handling results of maritime accidents, maritime accident investigation power is affected by the duality of benefiting society and the possibility of corruption, and should be restricted and supervised
[31]
. At present, maritime accident investigation power can already accept judicial supervision
[32]
, but there is still a lack of necessary supervision and restriction paths. The separation of maritime accident investigation power and maritime administrative law enforcement power is an inevitable requirement for the procedural division of power in the handling of maritime accidents and the realization of power checks and balances
[33]
. Therefore, the key to solving the chronic problems of maritime accident investigations lies in adjusting the subject structure, promoting the division of labor and coordination between investigation power and punishment power at the institutional level, constructing a dual-authority power structure where fact-finding and liability determination are independent yet effectively connected, and establishing a special organ responsible for maritime accident investigations outside the MSA.
3.3.1. Legal Powers
The investigation organ should be legally entrusted with independent investigation power, with core tasks including clarifying accident facts, revealing accident causes, proposing preventive recommendations, and conducting credit evaluations, without the function of administrative punishment or administrative adjudication. This organ is an independent authority equal in status to the MSA. The MSA is mainly responsible for maritime administrative law enforcement tasks. After a maritime accident occurs, the factual content investigated by the MSA mainly focuses on the final liability determination. In addition, the MSA should respect the content of the investigation report of the investigation organ, especially adopt the credit determination of the parties in the investigation report, and make the final administrative decision.
Therefore, special legislation should be formulated or additional clauses should be added to relevant laws such as the Maritime Traffic Safety Law and the Administrative Penalty Law to clarify the independent legal status of the maritime accident investigation organ and stipulate the functional positioning and scope of application of its investigation results.
3.3.2. Relationship Between the Two Organs
Under the dual-authority structure, the investigation organ and the MSA are not separated from each other, but realize the reasonable allocation of power operation through division of labor and cooperation. The relationship between the two is based on mutual independence and comprehensive connection. The core task of the investigation organ is to objectively restore the accident process, reveal in-depth causes, and propose targeted safety improvement recommendations. The functions of the MSA focus on liability determination, administrative punishment, and maintaining shipping order and public safety. This division of labor can effectively avoid the punitive orientation caused by the integration of investigation and punishment, thereby enhancing the impartiality of investigations and the legitimacy of law enforcement.
Specifically, the investigation organ should maintain organizational and functional independence, not be interfered by the MSA, to ensure the neutrality and professionalism of its investigation process. At the same time, the MSA should recognize and respect the authority of the investigation organ’s conclusions at the institutional level, take them as an important reference for liability attribution, and cannot arbitrarily select or reject them without direct evidence proving the error of the investigation conclusions. An information sharing and procedural connection mechanism should be established between the two.
3.3.3 Guarantee of Independence
On the premise of statutory powers and responsibilities, the independence of the fact-finding organ should be fully guaranteed from the perspectives of personnel composition and funding sources.
From the perspective of personnel composition, the appointment and removal procedures of the person in charge of the investigation organ should be directly stipulated by law, and intervention by the MSA should be avoided in terms of tenure guarantee and personnel arrangement to ensure that the investigation process is not affected by the law enforcement stance. At the same time, the staff of the investigation organ should have independent establishment, not be led by the MSA, and truly realize the structure where the investigation organ is completely separated from the MSA and parallel to it. From the perspective of funding sources, an independent revenue and expenditure system should be established, with funds separately listed in the national finance, to avoid relying on fund allocation from the MSA and eliminate the interest dependence between the two
[34]
.
4. Systematic Expansion of the Structural Optimization of Maritime Accident Investigations
After clarifying the dual-authority structure for handling maritime accidents, the traditional maritime accident investigation system has been deconstructed. It is necessary to restate the factual focus, procedural requirements, and result effectiveness of maritime accident investigations, and improve the systematic framework of maritime accident investigations.
4.1. Investigation Facts
The accident investigation system should first clarify the scope of investigation facts. The completeness and accuracy of facts not only determine the scientificity of accident cause analysis but also directly affect the rationality of subsequent liability determination and institutional improvement. Therefore, in fact-finding, different levels of the accident occurrence should be systematically distinguished and gradually expanded. It is necessary to clarify the direct causes triggering the accident, in-depth analyze the underlying indirect factors, and judge the parties’ cooperation degree in the investigation through the credit evaluation mechanism. On the basis of evaluating the cooperation degree and credibility of the investigated subjects, try to comprehensively restore the superficial facts and in-depth mechanisms of the accident occurrence.
4.1.1. Direct Causes
Direct causes are the key content that both law enforcement organs and investigation organs should focus on, and are one of the important bases for determining accident liability. They refer to the most direct and obvious triggering factors leading to the accident, usually manifested as unsafe states of people and objects, as well as energy and energy conversion
[35]
. In current investigation practices, the identification of direct causes is the primary link of fact-finding and the most easily presented part in the accident report. Through comprehensive analysis of the environment, accident process, ship equipment status, crew operation records, and on-site evidence, the direct incentives for the accident can be relatively clearly determined.
Specifically, the unsafe state of people mainly refers to human operational errors. Insufficient lookout by crew members, improper navigation operations, and delayed emergency response are often the direct triggers of accidents such as collisions and groundings. The unsafe state of objects generally refers to technical and equipment failures. Malfunctions of the ship’s power system, inaccuracies of navigation instruments, and unqualified fire-fighting equipment may all lead to loss of ship control or improper risk disposal. Energy and energy conversion can refer to the impact of external environmental factors. Adverse weather, sudden changes in sea conditions, and insufficient visibility are often the external direct factors of accidents.
4.1.2. Indirect Causes
The investigation organ should focus on accident factors other than the liability facts responsible for the MSA, and take direct causes as the entry point to in-depth analyze the indirect factors and in-depth risks of the accident. Compared with direct causes, indirect causes are not the direct triggering factors at the moment of the accident, but in-depth risk factors that have long been latent in institutional design, management mechanisms, and human factors environments, mostly referring to the management factors of enterprises
[36]
. They often exist before the accident occurs, and by gradual accumulation or overlapping with direct causes at critical moments, thereby amplifying the accident risk.
Indirect causes often manifest in the following three forms. Firstly, management and organizational defects. For example, shipping companies fail to strictly implement safety management systems, crew training is superficial, fatigue management is lacking, and on-duty systems are not strictly implemented. Although these management loopholes may not directly cause accidents, they significantly reduce the crew’s response capacity in emergency situations, making the probability and severity of accidents increase significantly. Secondly, insufficient systems and supervision. In some cases, the lax implementation of relevant laws and regulations, inadequate supervision by regulatory authorities, or regulatory standards lagging behind technological development may result in long-term failure to correct potential safety hazards. For example, ship inspections have formalistic problems, and some potential accident hazards are discovered but not thoroughly rectified, eventually evolving into major accidents in emergency situations. Thirdly, lack of safety culture and psychological factors. Crew members are in a high-pressure working environment for a long time. If enterprises and management fail to provide effective psychological support and a safety culture atmosphere, it will often lead to inattention, insufficient risk perception, and team communication barriers. Although these factors are difficult to quantify in liability determination, they play an amplifying role in the accident chain.
The identification of indirect causes has higher institutional value for accident investigations. It not only reveals the structural problems behind direct causes but also provides a basis for the investigation report to put forward systematic preventive recommendations. By tracing indirect causes, accident investigations can truly transcend the handling of individual incidents and be transformed into an opportunity to promote the improvement of legal norms, the strengthening of industry supervision, and the construction of enterprise safety culture.
4.1.3. Credit Evaluation
Another focus of the investigation organ is the credit of the parties. Credit evaluation in maritime accident investigations is not a mere moral judgment, but an institutionalized conclusion formed based on the comprehensive performance of the parties in fulfilling legal safety obligations, complying with operating norms, and cooperating with investigations
[37]
. Its value lies in connecting accident investigations with industry governance and risk prevention through quantitative and institutionalized methods, and promoting the cross-scenario use of credit evaluations.
Firstly, credit evaluation helps to restore the accident truth and improve the accuracy of conclusions
[38]
. The credit evaluation of the parties can directly affect the final handling results. If the parties refuse to cooperate, evade liability, or provide false information, they will bear the adverse consequence of damaged credit on the basis of existing legal liabilities. On the contrary, truthfully restoring the accident truth helps to reduce their legal liabilities and obtain credit points. Driven by the psychology of minimizing losses, the parties are generally willing to cooperate with the accident investigation to help restore the accident truth. Secondly, credit evaluation helps to fully reveal the compliance level behind the accident
[39]
. After conducting credit evaluation on the parties, it is possible to further judge the authenticity of the parties’ statements, supplement the objectivity of fact-finding, and help to in-depth discover the compliance of enterprise operations, providing in-depth optimization paths for future enterprise operation and management. Finally, credit evaluation can also enhance regulatory effects and expand the application field of accident investigation results. By establishing a national unified shipping safety credit platform, incorporating credit information in investigation conclusions into the industry database, and sharing it with other regulatory departments, cross-departmental joint supervision and risk early warning can be realized. It can not only optimize the allocation of government law enforcement resources but also promote enterprises to conduct self-regulation according to evaluation factors
[40]
. For example, in ship registration, shipping company qualification review, or financial institution risk assessment, the credit records of relevant subjects can be referred to, thereby transforming the results of a single accident investigation into a tool for long-term governance.
In summary, credit evaluation is not only a supplementary link of fact-finding but also an important part of the institutionalization and normalization of accident investigations. By incorporating credit evaluation into the accident investigation system, on the basis of clarifying the truth, it is possible to promote the formation of an honest and trustworthy industry environment, providing a solid foundation for the long-term governance of maritime transportation safety.
4.2. Investigation Procedures
Maritime accident investigations under the dual-authority model are essentially still administrative investigations. Therefore, both the MSA and the investigation organ (hereinafter collectively referred to as the investigation subject) should continue to uphold the position of authority doctrine. The investigation shall be conducted independently in accordance with legal provisions without being interfered by the will of the parties
[41]
.
4.2.1. Initiation Procedure
The initiation procedure of maritime accident investigations determines whether the maritime accident investigation subject can respond to maritime accidents in a timely manner and preserve relatively comprehensive evidence as soon as possible. The initiation procedure requires clear initiation conditions and initiation methods stipulated by law to ensure that the initiation of investigation power not only meets the requirements of due process but also has operability. Therefore, a combination of application-based and authority-based initiation methods should be adopted.
Due to the sudden nature of maritime accidents, there is a risk that the investigation subject may not discover the accident in a timely manner. Therefore, the investigation subject should be entrusted with the power to initiate the investigation procedure upon application, and conduct the investigation in a timely manner after receiving the accident report. In addition, given the relative maturity of current navigation supervision technology, administrative authorities have the possibility to manage maritime navigation safety. When the investigation subject monitors maritime navigation safety in accordance with its authority and discovers a maritime accident, it should also initiate the accident investigation procedure in a timely manner. Due to the complex nature of maritime accidents, when the investigation subject decides to carry out the accident investigation activity, it should timely judge the accident scale to determine jurisdiction, and timely notify the relevant authorities to transfer the investigation power or carry out a joint investigation.
In addition, the entire initiation procedure should be transparent and open. Announcements should be issued to the public in a timely manner without involving state secrets, trade secrets, or the parties’ privacy, explaining the basic situation of the accident, the legal basis for the initiation of the investigation, and the investigation purpose. For cases where the investigation procedure should be initiated but not initiated, the person in charge of the organ and relevant liable persons should bear corresponding administrative sanctions.
4.2.2. Investigation Methods
Clarifying investigation methods is an inevitable requirement of the principle of administration according to law
[42]
. After the initiation of the investigation procedure, the investigation subject should choose the investigation method independently according to the circumstances of the accident. Given the diversity of investigation methods, the investigation methods should be clearly defined by comprehensively adopting general provisions, enumeration, and exclusion.
Firstly, the investigation subject should be generally authorized to take necessary measures to achieve the investigation purpose, and the power to choose the investigation method should be left to the investigation subject’s discretion. Secondly, on the basis of the current legal provisions, the investigation methods that the investigation subject can use should be supplemented and enumerated as comprehensively as possible. Specifically, in addition to the investigation methods specified in Article 84 of the Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Article 11 of the Regulations on the Investigation and Handling of Maritime Traffic Accidents, at least methods such as crew psychological counseling, involved enterprise culture assessment, and party credit evaluation should be added to realize the comprehensive investigation of the indirect causes of the accident and the parties’ credit. Finally, the investigation subject should be prohibited from using inhumane methods that violate the dignity of the counterpart
[43]
.
4.2.3. Protection of Rights
When the investigation organ conducts investigation activities, the protection of the rights of the investigated objects mainly focuses on the substantive realization of the right to statement and defense. On the one hand, clearly inform the parties that the content of their statements and defenses will not be directly used for liability attribution, and the credit incentives obtained after telling the truth can reduce penalties, while false statements will lead to credit deductions, so as to encourage the parties to tell the truth and fully protect their right to statement. On the other hand, smooth the channels for the parties to defend themselves. In addition to truthfully recording the parties’ defense content in the investigation report and clearly stating that defense will not lead to more severe handling results, the investigated objects should also be granted the right to apply for review and appeal against controversial investigation conclusions. For investigation conclusions that directly affect the parties’ rights, the parties should also be informed of their right to apply for administrative reconsideration and file an administrative lawsuit
[44]
.
4.2.4. Connection Mechanism
The connection mechanism of the investigation procedure mainly involves the recognition of investigation results between the investigation organ and the MSA. The investigation organ is mainly responsible for investigating the safety facts of the accident, and the MSA is mainly responsible for determining the liability facts of the accident
[45]
. The final administrative decision made by the MSA should comprehensively be based on the liability facts, the safety facts investigated by the investigation organ, and the credit evaluation results. Moreover, the impact of the credit evaluation results on the final administrative decision should be clarified. Unless there is obvious evidence to refute the safety facts and credit evaluation results determined by the investigation organ, the MSA should fully adopt the investigation organ’s recommendations on the parties’ liability determination and shall not arbitrarily select or reject the content of the investigation report made by the investigation organ. When there is a dispute between the MSA and the investigation organ over the investigation results, the State Council should be requested to make a ruling.
4.3. Investigation Results
Detailed investigation results are the ultimate pursuit of accident investigations and the institutional expression of implementing the preventive function of accident investigations. Therefore, the content and legal effect of the investigation results should be clarified to promote the investigation results to substantially improve the safety level and prevent accident risks.
4.3.1. Report Content
The investigation subjects shall make final investigation reports within their respective terms of reference, but the content focus of the two is different.
The investigation report made by the investigation organ is formally divided into four parts, with substantive content covering the direct causes, indirect causes of the accident, the credit evaluation of the accident parties, and safety recommendations. In the parts of indirect causes and the parties’ credit evaluation, suggestions on whether to reduce legal liabilities should be attached, together with reasons. If it is determined to reduce the legal liabilities that the parties should bear, the specific scope of liability reduction should be attached. In the part of safety recommendations, clear and specific recommendations should be put forward for all causes of the accident. The investigation results made by the MSA mainly focus on liability determination.
4.3.2. Legal Effect
Although the Reply to the Letter from the Maritime Safety Administration of the Ministry of Transport Requesting Clarification on Whether Maritime Investigation Conclusions Are Litigable (Fa Min Si [2019] No. 15) has clearly stipulated that the maritime accident liability determination certificate is litigable, based on the basic principles of administrative acts, it should be reaffirmed that the investigation report has the dual attributes of administrative procedure and administrative act. The part involving fact-finding only serves as factual evidence, which may not be adopted if there is sufficient evidence to refute it; the part involving the parties’ credit evaluation and liability determination should be identified as an administrative act that directly affects the rights and obligations of the counterpart
[46]
.
In addition, the parties to whom the safety recommendations are made by the investigation organ should fully adopt them. The investigation organ should supervise the implementation of the recommendations to avoid the recurrence of similar incidents
[47]
. The parties who fail to rectify in a timely manner according to the safety recommendations should be recorded in the credit evaluation system.
4.3.3. Disclosure Mechanism
“Sunlight is the best disinfectant.”Disclosing the conclusions after the event is one of the basic requirements of the principle of administrative openness, which can not only prevent and control the abuse of administrative power but also improve the acceptability and scope of acceptance of the conclusions
[48]
. From the perspective of power supervision, disclosing the investigation report helps to realize public supervision over the investigation results and prevent the investigation subject from abusing power. When the investigation subject receives feedback on supervision and questioning from the public, it should timely answer the public’s doubts. From the perspective of improving the acceptability and scope of acceptance of the conclusions, disclosing the investigation report facilitates relevant industry institutions, crew members, etc., to pay attention to the causes of safety accidents in a timely manner, effectively prevent similar accident risks, and expand the scope of acceptance of safety recommendations. Therefore, all investigation results should be proactively disclosed without involving state secrets, trade secrets, or the parties’ privacy.
5. Conclusion
The principal contradiction that maritime accident investigations must address has shifted from closing an evidentiary chain to reconstructing the truth of the accident. Optimizing maritime accident investigation power is not only an urgent need to cure its structural chronic problems and restore the accident truth but also an inevitable requirement to enhance the humanistic care for crew members, as well as a necessary choice to respond to the development needs of the international community, which helps to eliminate potential maritime safety hazards from the source. The dual-authority structure can maximize the function of administrative organs in serving the marine industry, strengthen the preventive effect of maritime accident investigations, and create an honest and trustworthy marine enterprise cultural atmosphere. Under the premise of implementing basic concepts such as ex ante prevention and “putting people first,”by establishing an accident investigation organ independent of the MSA, separating safety investigations from liability investigations completely, with clear division of labor and mutual checks and balances, the accident investigation system centered on punishment can be completely eliminated. With the assistance of the integrity-based incentive mechanism, the parties’ willingness to cooperate increases, realizing the collaborative governance of maritime accidents.
Abbreviations

MSA

the Maritime Safety Administration

IMO

The International Maritime Organization

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board
Author Contributions
Wu Songyu: Conceptualization, Funding acquisition, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – original draft
Du Jiaqi: Investigation, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Visualization
Hou Meixiang: Data curation, Investigation, Writing – original draft, Visualization
Wu Changyue: Formal Analysis, Project administration, Validation, Writing - review & editing
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. All authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose related to the research content of China’s maritime accident investigation structural optimization, including no financial support, research cooperation, or other interests that may affect the objectivity and impartiality of the research results. The research is carried out based on the objective analysis of the current situation of maritime accident investigation in China and the reference of international advanced experience, and the conclusions and suggestions put forward are independent and objective without being interfered by any third party.
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    Songyu, W., Jiaqi, D., Meixiang, H., Changyue, W. (2026). Research on Structural Optimization of China’s Maritime Accident Investigation. Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 10(2), 155-167. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12

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    Songyu, W.; Jiaqi, D.; Meixiang, H.; Changyue, W. Research on Structural Optimization of China’s Maritime Accident Investigation. J. Public Policy Adm. 2026, 10(2), 155-167. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12

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    Songyu W, Jiaqi D, Meixiang H, Changyue W. Research on Structural Optimization of China’s Maritime Accident Investigation. J Public Policy Adm. 2026;10(2):155-167. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12

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  • @article{10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12,
  author = {Wu Songyu and Du Jiaqi and Hou Meixiang and Wu Changyue},
  title = {Research on Structural Optimization of China’s Maritime Accident Investigation},
  journal = {Journal of Public Policy and Administration},
  volume = {10},
  number = {2},
  pages = {155-167},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jppa.20261002.12},
  abstract = {The central contradiction that maritime accident investigations aim to resolve has shifted from establishing a closed chain of evidence to authentically reconstructing the truth of accidents. At present, maritime accident investigations in China are still dominated by a value orientation of accountability attribution, lacking a genuine people?centered approach and insufficiently reconciling the interests of multiple stakeholders. The mechanized investigation procedures carried out by a single administrative authority often incomplete and one?sided factual findings, which not only impede the formulation of effective preventive measures but also fail to fully protect the legitimate rights and interests of the parties concerned. Based on advanced international experience, investigations should be guided by the core principles of ex?ante prevention, integrity incentives, and collaborative governance. It is proposed that an independent maritime accident investigation agency, separate from the Maritime Safety Administration, be established. This agency shall conduct a comprehensive investigation into all contributing factors of maritime accidents, put forward targeted safety recommendations, supervise their implementation, and conduct credit assessments of relevant parties. Such credit assessments shall directly influence the final administrative decisions issued by the Maritime Safety Administration, so as to reshape the institutional power system of maritime accident investigations through a dual?subject structure.},
 year = {2026}
}

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  • TY  - JOUR
T1  - Research on Structural Optimization of China’s Maritime Accident Investigation
AU  - Wu Songyu
AU  - Du Jiaqi
AU  - Hou Meixiang
AU  - Wu Changyue
Y1  - 2026/03/30
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12
T2  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
JF  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
JO  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
SP  - 155
EP  - 167
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2696
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.12
AB  - The central contradiction that maritime accident investigations aim to resolve has shifted from establishing a closed chain of evidence to authentically reconstructing the truth of accidents. At present, maritime accident investigations in China are still dominated by a value orientation of accountability attribution, lacking a genuine people?centered approach and insufficiently reconciling the interests of multiple stakeholders. The mechanized investigation procedures carried out by a single administrative authority often incomplete and one?sided factual findings, which not only impede the formulation of effective preventive measures but also fail to fully protect the legitimate rights and interests of the parties concerned. Based on advanced international experience, investigations should be guided by the core principles of ex?ante prevention, integrity incentives, and collaborative governance. It is proposed that an independent maritime accident investigation agency, separate from the Maritime Safety Administration, be established. This agency shall conduct a comprehensive investigation into all contributing factors of maritime accidents, put forward targeted safety recommendations, supervise their implementation, and conduct credit assessments of relevant parties. Such credit assessments shall directly influence the final administrative decisions issued by the Maritime Safety Administration, so as to reshape the institutional power system of maritime accident investigations through a dual?subject structure.
VL  - 10
IS  - 2
ER  -

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Author Information

  • Wu Songyu

    Law School, Dalian Maritime University, Shanghai, China

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  • Du Jiaqi

    China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China

  • Hou Meixiang

    Law School, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, China

    Contact Email

  • Wu Changyue

    Law School, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, China

    Contact Email

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