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Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality

Received: 8 April 2015     Accepted: 11 April 2015     Published: 22 April 2015
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Abstract

This article starts from the interpretation of subjective experience and narrative hermeneutics, suggesting a cognitive re-evaluation of egotic intentionality from the “first-person perspective” and showing together the conjunction between phenomenology and cognitivism (the egotic self). The article also addresses the phenomenal consciousness according to D. Dennett’s theory of intentionality. In an attempt to highlight the reflected self as a form of consciousness, the work seeks the continuous updating of the divided self (hyphenated self) and the discovery of a new hybrid self by intercommunication and the awareness of self through “us”. Based on the theory of mind, the fluctuations of self and subjectivity aim at revealing the self existence. However, by the need to rethink the self position in relation to the hyper-reality of the mental metabolism, this article explores self-awareness as a new form of intentional dynamics / intentionality.

Published in American Journal of Applied Psychology (Volume 4, Issue 3)
DOI 10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11
Page(s) 50-54
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2015. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Mind, Phenomenal Intentionality, Self-Consciousness, Subjectivity, Heuristics

References
[1] Block, Ned. “On a confusion about a function of consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, 2/1995, pp. 227-287. Retrieved from http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/bbs/Archive/bbs.block.html on March 1, 2015.
[2] Searle, J. Mintea. Scurtă introducere în filosofia minții, trad. de Iustina Cojocaru, pref. de Adrian Niță, Editura Herlad, Bucureşti, 2013, p.86.
[3] MacIntyre, A. Tratat de morală. După virtute, trad. de Catrinel Pleşu, Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998, pp.214, 219.
[4] Ricoeur, P. De la text la acţiune. Eseuri de hermeneutică II, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Echinox, 1999.
[5] Place, U.T. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”. In Mind, Brains and Computers. The Foudations of Cognitive Science. An Anthology, ed. R. Cummins şi D. Dellarosa Cummins, Oxford, Blackwell Publ., 2000.
[6] Baars, Bernard J. “In the Theater of Consciousness. Global Workspace Theory, A Rigorous Scientific Theory of Consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, No. 4. 1997, pp. 292-309. Retrieved from http://www.imprint.co.uk/theatre.htm on April 15, 2015.
[7] Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness Explained. Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, New York, 1991.
[8] Brentano, Franz: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge, London, 2009.
[9] Jacob, Pierre. What Minds Can Do. Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Cristina-Georgiana Voicu. (2015). Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality. American Journal of Applied Psychology, 4(3), 50-54. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11

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    ACS Style

    Cristina-Georgiana Voicu. Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality. Am. J. Appl. Psychol. 2015, 4(3), 50-54. doi: 10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11

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    AMA Style

    Cristina-Georgiana Voicu. Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality. Am J Appl Psychol. 2015;4(3):50-54. doi: 10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11,
      author = {Cristina-Georgiana Voicu},
      title = {Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality},
      journal = {American Journal of Applied Psychology},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {50-54},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ajap.20150403.11},
      abstract = {This article starts from the interpretation of subjective experience and narrative hermeneutics, suggesting a cognitive re-evaluation of egotic intentionality from the “first-person perspective” and showing together the conjunction between phenomenology and cognitivism (the egotic self). The article also addresses the phenomenal consciousness according to D. Dennett’s theory of intentionality. In an attempt to highlight the reflected self as a form of consciousness, the work seeks the continuous updating of the divided self (hyphenated self) and the discovery of a new hybrid self by intercommunication and the awareness of self through “us”. Based on the theory of mind, the fluctuations of self and subjectivity aim at revealing the self existence. However, by the need to rethink the self position in relation to the hyper-reality of the mental metabolism, this article explores self-awareness as a new form of intentional dynamics / intentionality.},
     year = {2015}
    }
    

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    AB  - This article starts from the interpretation of subjective experience and narrative hermeneutics, suggesting a cognitive re-evaluation of egotic intentionality from the “first-person perspective” and showing together the conjunction between phenomenology and cognitivism (the egotic self). The article also addresses the phenomenal consciousness according to D. Dennett’s theory of intentionality. In an attempt to highlight the reflected self as a form of consciousness, the work seeks the continuous updating of the divided self (hyphenated self) and the discovery of a new hybrid self by intercommunication and the awareness of self through “us”. Based on the theory of mind, the fluctuations of self and subjectivity aim at revealing the self existence. However, by the need to rethink the self position in relation to the hyper-reality of the mental metabolism, this article explores self-awareness as a new form of intentional dynamics / intentionality.
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Author Information
  • Romanian Academy, Ia?i, Romania

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