Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World

Yuri Granin

doi:doi:10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13

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Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World

Yuri Granin^*

Published in Science Frontiers (Volume 7, Issue 1)

Received: 12 December 2025 Accepted: 4 January 2026 Published: 27 January 2026

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Abstract

The problem of historical dynamics and polarization of the world is discussed in the context of the social evolution of mankind and civilizational analysis of history. The latter is theoretically diverse. It contains two alternative research strategies: universalistic and particularistic. Comparing them, the author proposes to consider the process of "civilizing" countries and peoples in the context of the evolution of communities of the species Homo sapiens and the implementation of a more general macrohistorical trend: the globalization of mankind. It is shown that in this context, the "civilization" of mankind appears as an other being ("its other") of its globalization, realized through a variety of regional socio-cultural forms of embodiment of this general historical trend. The largest and most stable of these forms of human coexistence are "civilizations" and the "development models" they create. In geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects, the competition of civilizations for influence, territories and resources concentrated on them is similar to the movement of the "geological plates" of the earth's crust, the movement of which determines the dynamics of world history, forming successive "poles of development". At present, humanity has returned from a short-lived state of dominance of the Euro-Atlantic (Anglo-Saxon) civilization led by the United States to the state of a multipolar World. This was expressed in the resuscitation of the civilizational and national self-awareness of the largest regional powers of the planet, who acutely felt the objective value-semantic confrontation with the West as special "civilization countries". This and much more stimulated Russia to turn away from the unfriendly West to the South and East.

Published in	Science Frontiers (Volume 7, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13
Page(s)	32-39
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Barbarism, Globalization, Culture, Civilization, State-civilization, Civilizational Models

1. Introduction

In discussing the productivity of using the terms "civilization" and "civilizations" to analyze the historical dynamics and polarization of the world, it is worth noting the following circumstance. Specifically, for many years in Russia, this issue has been discussed within the framework of two research strategies: universalist and particularist. Both are based on a substantial-activity ontology of history and the associated understanding of the "civilization" of humanity as a world-historical process. The difference lies in the interpretation of the nature of its implementation. But which of these strategies is preferable? And will humanity in the foreseeable future achieve the desired civilizational unity, transforming into a global community of peoples and nations open to each other?

2. Particularist and Universalist Understandings of the "Civilization" of Humanity

The "particular" understanding of the "civilization" (civilization) of humanity considers this process in the context of the socio-cultural evolution of the species Homo sapiens: as a multi-linear process of integrating human associations into increasingly larger, structurally and functionally more complex communities of people, the most "creative" of which turn out to be "civilizations"

[1]

. They are also the most stable "historical structures" (F. Braudel), the "hermeticity" of which is ensured by the "dominant culture" inherent in each civilization. "Culture," notes A.A. Gusseinov, "like a shell, gives each civilization a hermeticity that allows, even forces it to recognize itself as the only one, not as one of many (or several), but precisely the only one"

[2]

. Within this understanding, world history is conceived as a nonlinear sequence of developmental stages (primitive-barbarian-civilization), realized "always differently" in different regions of the planet. Beginning with the periods of the "Neolithic" and "urban" revolutions (G. Child), it is understood as a competition between civilizations for influence, territories, and the resources concentrated therein, a competition that continues to this day. Thus, without denying, but rather bracketing, the integrity of the historical process, attention is focused on the diversity and geographic localism of its implementation in the form of individual civilizations, whose sociocultural diversity hinders the unification of the Earth's population into a "global community of mutually open nations"

[3-6]

In turn, the universalist paradigm draws attention to the presence of the "universal" - the invariant - in the content of anthropohistory, interpreting the global tendency of the civilization of the species Homo sapiens as a cumulative process of the formation and dissemination on an ever-increasing scale of "general historical" (universal) "forms" or "institutions of development" that oppose "barbarism" as "its own other" civilization. As such institutions, researchers typically distinguish "private property," "market," "law," "democracy," and "personal autonomy"

[7-9]

. And "barbarism" is interpreted not as a historical phenomenon that preceded the emergence of the first civilizations and coexisted for a long time alongside civilized forms of human coexistence, but as a constantly reproducing internal contradiction of the very process of civilizing humanity, which has never managed to rid itself of violence, wars, and cruelty. Theoretically, this "intra-civilizational" contradiction, wrote V.M. Mezhuev, "can be resolved only in one way: by interpreting civilization not as an empirically recorded set of different civilizations, but as the process of becoming a common, unified, and, consequently, universal civilization. In relation to this, all currently existing civilizations, including the Western one, appear as its preparatory phases or stages"

[10]

Of course, I would add, one could also take other approaches: by excluding "barbarism" as a regularly recurring phenomenon from the civilizational process, interpreting the latter in a particularistic vein. But this would mean betraying the paradigm of universalism, which, as already noted, is, on socio-philosophical grounds, equally powerful as the strategy of particularism. Nevertheless, the latter is preferable for at least two reasons.

Unlike the "universalist" interpretation of the civilizational process, developed primarily by social philosophers, the concept of multiple civilizations does not ignore the findings of historical sociology, social and cultural anthropology, and ethnology, which now underpin the theory of human social evolution. Rather, it draws on these findings as an empirical basis for creating an evolutionary, interdisciplinary concept of "civilization" and "civilizations," where each civilizational formation embodies one of a number of realized and possible lines of human development. This approach, as will be shown, does not exclude, but calls into question, the formation of a "universal (world) civilization." This is, firstly.

Secondly, the postulates of "universalists" regarding the development of certain "universal" (suitable for all humanity) political, legal, economic, and other forms of development during the course of civilization ignore the historical fact that these forms were initially developed by Greco-Roman civilization, then "revived" (the Renaissance), refined, and developed in the states of Western Europe in the 16th-18th centuries, and subsequently imposed on other peoples through the process of colonization and conquest, migrating to other countries and continents. So, can they, in this case, be considered "possessing universal content"? There is no consensus on this matter

[11]

The universal (common human) in anthropohistory truly exists and is realized through the historically particular. However, it must be taken into account that its content changes over time in specific historical forms of implementation. Currently, for example, the "universal institutions and mechanisms" identified by proponents of the universalist paradigm, when used in societies and states of different civilizations, undergo astonishing metamorphoses, changing their content and functionality to the point of opposite meanings. This was observed in the second half of the 20th century, when the new states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, formed as a result of decolonization, attempted to "modernize." The results were worse than expected, which ultimately led to the collapse of the then-popular "modernization theory." And today, this effect of "intertwined modernities" is observed almost everywhere. For example, while retaining formal characteristics, contemporary "democracies" in the United States, Russia, China, or, say, Iraq, are substantively different. This allows many experts, by absolutizing these differences and qualifying their own models of political democracy as models, to exclude Russia, China, and dozens of other countries from the ranks of "democratic states." Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the "universal" forms of "civilization" we now observe in most countries of the world are defined as such retrospectively—in relation to a past that has already occurred. But they, like the entire "past" in general, cannot be unconditionally extrapolated into the future, which, strictly speaking, is only tentatively known to us.

Based on the principle of natural-historical constructivism, we recognize that the historical future of all communities without exception is consciously (albeit to varying degrees) and largely rationally constructed by people based on their perceptions of the proper state of local and global community. "But the consequences of these collective actions (due to the impossibility of 'knowing' the full scope of social, constantly changing connections, and, even more so, the 'wills' of the individuals who make decisions in large part spontaneously and intuitively) turn out to be quite different from what many 'builders' of the future ("just," "free," "democratic," "classless"—and so on) community had hoped for. It follows from this that not a single major social project has ever been realized as intended: the outcome has not been what was intended. And often, even “completely different” when it came to projects for a future just world order for all peoples inhabiting the Earth”

[12]

. Thus, the advent of the “era of civilization for humanity,” the “mechanisms” for the development of which, as A.S. Nikolsky writes, “are the separation of powers, the rule of law, democracy, the market, political and ideological pluralism, recognition of the value of the original rights and freedoms of each person, etc.”

[9]

, is not at all predetermined. Despite the extraordinary increase in the scale of communications and the activities of international organizations, humanity continues to remain economically, politically, culturally and, more broadly, civilizationally divided, and the above-mentioned mechanisms and institutions for its “civilization” in fact turn out to be yet another version of the “westernization” of the world: an extrapolation of the characteristics of the Euro-Atlantic civilizational model of development to all of humanity.

'll elaborate on this point later. For now, I'd like to offer a slightly different twist on the topic under discussion, examining the process of "civilizing" countries and peoples in the context of a more general macrohistorical trend: the globalization of humanity. In this context, the emergence of a "worldwide (global) civilization" isn't excluded, but it finds itself in the realm of utopia with an uncertain future. And the "civilization" of humanity appears as an otherworldly aspect ("its own otherness") of its globalization, realized through a diversity of regional forms of embodying this general historical trend. And here's why.

3. The Globalization of Humanity

Like most categories in the social sciences, the term "globalization" lacks a universally accepted definition, although it is applied to nearly all fundamental aspects of human activity: economics, politics, culture, and so on. In our case, we are talking about the globalization of "humanity," understood as a historically changing set of individuals, past and present, of a biological population of a certain species—"Homo sapiens". This population, through the creation of "suprabiological life programs" ("cultures"), has transformed its existence into a diversity of sociocultural forms of shared life in the course of social evolution and in the process of its spread across the planet—i.e., "globalization." But this is only one of the many meanings of this term, whose meaning changes depending on the disciplinary affiliation of the researchers using it. In my opinion, there is only one way to get rid of this semantic pluralism: to use the concept of “globalization” as a metadisciplinary analytical category that synthesizes both meanings of the term “global”: which goes back to the Latin globus (planetary) and the French global (universal, worldwide). In this context, the globalization of humanity can be interpreted promisingly not only as a historically conditioned geographical spread of people and their communities, the economic and political models of life together that they have created, ideas, artifacts, symbols and information within and beyond regions and continents

[13]

, but also as a mega-tendency, originating in ancient times and unfinished to this day, towards the formation and subsequent unification of communities of people into a global (planetary) community, embodied in the dialectic of spatio-temporal movements, interactions and transformations of anthroposocial entities.

This understanding guides the study of globalization in relation to the evolution of interests (needs), worldviews, and forms of consciousness of interacting, spatially localized collective historical subjects, who undergo various transformations and absorptions through migrations, trade, financial-economic, military-political, and spiritual-cultural interactions, resulting in the formation of new, numerically and spatially larger social, political, and sociocultural anthroposocial entities: objectively and subjectively-symbolically integrated into "societies" (clans, tribes, tribal unions, ethnic groups, nations) and "civilizations" of individual associations. History as we know it is a nonlinear process of mutually conditioning tendencies of differentiation and integration among the anthroposocial communities that form humanity, its (humanity's) structural complexity, and, simultaneously, the formation of its integrity and unity.

I have analyzed this process, its stages, and the historical forms of its implementation in detail in several monographs. Here, it is worth noting the following circumstances.

Firstly, the geographical globalization of humanity over the millennia has been accompanied by its social evolution: that is, by the process of integrating the individuals comprising humanity into increasingly complex and larger human associations. This integration was multi-linear in nature, but was generally characterized as "a process of structural reorganization over time, resulting in the emergence of a form or structure qualitatively different from its predecessor"

[14]

Understanding anthropohistory as a nonlinear and multi-vector process of social integration (and the accompanying differentiation) does not, of course, exclude 1) the possibility of constructing some resulting "general line" of cumulative social progress and 2) the use of a methodology oriented toward the search for and analysis of the structural components and states of historically changing human communities as self-organizing large and small collectives. Such a methodology can be called the "methodology of structures and states." At one time (1939), it was embodied in the work of Norbert Elias "On the Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Studies," which demonstrated the close interdependence of the processes of "progressive integration" and "progressive differentiation" of social structures with the same processes in the psyche of the "upper layer of the laity" of the late Middle Ages in Western countries. Now it is actively used in historical sociology and psychology, historical, political and cultural anthropology. This, in addition to the works of foreign researchers, is evidenced by the works of O. Yu. Artemova, D.M. Bondarenko, L.E. Grinin, A. Korotaev, N.N. Kradin, N.S. Rozov, E.A. Shinakov and some other russian authors.

Many of them identify with a movement known as "social evolution theory." However, their work can also be classified as being within the framework of the sociogenetic approach to the analysis of anthropohistory. Within this framework, human history is understood as its progressive movement up the ladder of social evolution: from a state of "primitiveness" (savagery) through a state of "barbarism" to a state of "civilization" (or, "civilization"). Each of these states is characterized by specific social (i.e., political, social, economic, cultural, mental, and other) orders of life within human communities. These "social orders of organization and development" of the economic, political, social, and other spheres of life within human communities mutually determine one another. Moreover, as many specialists believe, the leading role belongs to cultural (and corresponding mental) orders as the primary means of transmitting social experience.

These empirically confirmed theoretical propositions of sociogenetics, which underlie the distinctions between "barbarian" and "civilized" communities, should certainly be taken into account by philosophers who undertake to discuss the problem of the relationship between "barbarism" and "civilization" in contemporary Russia and other countries. This discussion will be productive if one fundamental circumstance is taken into account: the historical variability of the "barbarian world" (Barbaricum) itself, which changes its characteristics as contacts with the "world of civilizations" expand. In this case, a complex convergence of these worlds is observed, especially visibly manifested in the situation of "borderlands." This process is most vividly revealed, notes V.P. Budanova, by the history of the Great Migration (2nd-7th centuries), when the consolidated space of ethnic barbarians became for civilization not only a "danger zone" but, for the first time in history, it seemed, a "marker" for simple solutions. "For these were no longer simply 'barbarians,' but 'barbarians' pene consimiles, 'almost similar' to the representatives of the civilized part of the Oecumene. The barbarian component manifested itself as an indicator of crisis and the beginning of the formation of a new civilization"

[15]

. And each such civilization, the author summarizes, forms its own concept of the "barbarian" and its own "barbarian stereotypes," based on specific historical, political, and ideological circumstances, and the ideological, philosophical, literary, and emotional preferences of those writing and reading

[15]

Thus, drawing clear geographical and temporal boundaries between periods of barbarism and civilization in human history is only tentative and purely analytical. Any large country still retains fragments of archaism. This is what can be called the presence of the "past in the present." In particular, so-called "military democracy," "councils of elders," "blood feud," "gift exchange," and so on—the most common forms of governance and regulation of social relations among barbarian tribes and tribal unions of antiquity—continue to exist in modern ethnic communities organized along tribal and clan lines, living in remote places. These can be called enclaves of barbarism within a civilized environment. But they are not the product of "civilization." Therefore, discussing "modern barbarism" as initiated by "modern civilization" only makes sense when using the word "barbarism" in scholarly quotation marks. Otherwise, the term loses its status as an analytical category, transforming into an interscientific metaphor, the scope of whose applicability is currently snowballing. This is largely due to the lack of new categories for analyzing increasingly complex social reality. In this context, it is promising to discuss a broader theoretical scope: the scale of distribution, conditions, and extent of reproduction of the historical "past" in modern states

[16]

. This is the second circumstance that is worth paying attention to.

Third, when constructing any periodizations of history, one must not forget their relativity: all of them rest on predetermined foundations and ultimately realize a progressive and linear version of human history. Meanwhile, like natural history, human social evolution is a nonlinear process and the result of the interaction, competition, and struggle of numerous individual and collective agents of historical action: individuals, states, and civilizations. The latter can be productively interpreted as large communities of people and/or their aggregates (communities) that, possessing a complex, multicomponent structure, realize various cultural-historical types of development within the space of planetary history, embodying and embodying the potential of various possibilities and paths of human evolution in the past and the foreseeable future. [For more details, see 1].

Accordingly, with the emergence of large civilizations, for which the best political form of existence, development, and expansion was "empire," human history acquired a global (universal) quality, emerging as the result of many attempts to organize a common space for the shared life of peoples and states based on various "civilizational models" of development. This process can be conceptualized as follows.

4. Competition Between Civilizational Models of Development

The prehistory of human globalization goes back to the distant past. Humanity's emergence from nature and its victory in the competitive struggle with animals and hominids were conditioned not only by changes in the methods of producing material goods, but also by the transformation of spiritual and practical forms of production and the organization of social life. Initially, these were apparently associated with an unreflective awareness of the basic need for communication and coexistence with others, the development of kinship (family) relationships, cooperation, and solidarity, realized on the basis of categories of evidence entrenched in oral collective memory

[17]

. In this way, or more or less, at the dawn of humanity, a common social space for people to live together formed within the first human societies (societies), the integrity of which was ensured by common economic, cultural, mental, and other orders of life. These mutually conditioned each other, but in the primitive era, they had not yet been institutionalized by non-clan (territorial) forms of governance.

For example, the evolution of social orders from a state of primitiveness to barbarism followed the line "family" - "family group" (concentrated in "camps" or "villages") - "clan" - "tribe" - "ethnos." These communities were characterized by different political orders of organizing communal life: "communities without permanent leadership" - "community with a big man" - "chiefdom (chiefdom)" - complex chiefdom (complex chiefdom), otherwise known as "proto-state"

[18, 19]

. Economic and social inequality, which destroyed the rituals of solidarity and mutual assistance, appears during the transition of primitive communities to a state of "barbarism," and then to a state of "civilization." This state, researchers note, is characterized by the presence of social institutions that ensure the reproduction and transmission of common norms and values—the regulators of the order of communal life. The most important of them are corporations organized by professional affiliation (priestly, artisanal, commercial, military, etc.), educational systems (schools) and, of course, “states” as the main factors in the emergence of written law and separate types of spiritual and practical activity: the first “philosophies”, “sciences” and “arts”.

Thus, approximately 5,000-6,000 years ago, in the fertile valleys of the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, Indus, and Yellow Rivers, the first islands of "civilization" emerged, surrounded by a sea of "barbarism," which later transformed into "continents" of civilized forms of life. This process was associated with the expansion of the field of contact between linguistically and culturally diverse societies, the emergence of cities and state-based forms of life, the development and evolution of writing, and universal (logical) forms and categories of thought. The abstracting power of these, coupled with the productive capacity of the imagination, expanded the horizons of consciousness and globalized the sphere of ideas about the interconnections of people with the surrounding world, placing them within a spherical space-time continuum of shared life with the Gods. Thus, above all the local socio-cultural differences in theogonies and mythopoetic traditions, a symbolic connection of times was built, the idea of the origin of an initially united “humanity” was formed, which then, in the so-called Axial Age of Eurasia (between 800 - 200 BC), became widespread, having been originally transformed in various religious and philosophical teachings that laid the foundations of subsequent “world” cultures, religions and civilizations.

“Confucius and Lao Tzu lived in China at that time,” writes K. Jaspers, “all schools of Chinese philosophy arose, Mo Tzu, Zhuang Tzu, Lie Tzu and countless others* thought. The Upanishads arose in India, Buddha lived*; in philosophy—in India, as in China—all possibilities of philosophical comprehension of reality were considered, right up to skepticism, materialism, sophistry and nihilism; in Iran, Zarathustra taught about a world where there is a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine, the prophets Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Second Isaiah spoke; in Greece, this was the time of Homer, the philosophers Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, the tragedians, Thucydides and Archimedes*. Everything that is connected with these names arose almost simultaneously over the course of a few centuries in China, India and the West, independently of each other”

[20]

. Beyond the emergence of a personal (existent) principle in reflective individuals like ourselves, the new developments of this era were connected with the rise of the idea of the globality of the world, the unity of humanity, and the individual's personal responsibility for the existence and preservation of the anonymous world of existence. This idea was subsequently taken up and developed in its own unique way, first by Christianity and then by Islam. Parallel to and alongside the development of philosophical and religious concepts globalizing the world and humanity, an intellectual search for political and legal forms of communal life proceeded. But this search was carried out in the face of fierce anthroposocial competition.

Since the Neolithic Revolution, the entire known history of Homo sapiens is a history of migrations, great migrations, and wars between primitive and post-primitive, pre-state and state-formed groups and societies for geographic space: territories of residence and the resources concentrated within these territories, including human resources. These resources, including human resources, could be retained for a sufficiently long period by the newcomers and victors only by organizing a common economic and political space for the people inhabiting these territories through the development of universal (for them) norms of communal life. Thus arose first early states and their analogues, and later, ethnic and multi-ethnic imperial states, pursuing policies of assimilation and integration of linguistically, religiously, and culturally diverse populations into new, relatively homogeneous social entities: "civilizations" striving to expand to the limits of the known ecumene.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, this spread took the form of military and colonial expansion. The consequence, in addition to increased transport flows and communications, was the transfer of literary and artistic works, technology, religious and secular ideologies, scientific knowledge and rationality, and norms and models of economic, political, and social life beyond local territories, regions, and continents. The inevitable "clash of cultures" in such cases was accompanied by various types of borrowing, unintentional assimilation, and deliberate acculturation by the "metropoles," as well as "symbolic violence," which provoked resistance from the linguistically and culturally diverse non-believing populations of the conquered and colonized territories. But in any case, the knowledge, artifacts, and institutions of some peoples became accessible to others, acquiring the status of "global" values, expanding horizons and transforming worldviews, step by step making an economically, socioculturally, and politically divided humanity increasingly interconnected materially, intellectually, and spiritually, the idea of "humanity" and its anthropobiological unity subjectively conceived and psychologically acceptable, and the unification of "humanity" into a global entity a philosophically and politically sound "project." The latter, if we begin with Immanuel Kant's treatise, has received numerous incarnations, but still remains a utopia with an uncertain future.

Without the space to explore this issue in greater detail, I will focus on the main point: the natural-historical nature of the dialectic of globalization and human civilization, within which the current (and far from ideal) state of humanity has become the culmination of many attempts to organize a common space for the shared life of peoples and states based on various "civilizational models" of development. In this case, "civilizational models of development" refers to the forms and institutions of political, economic, social, and cultural-spiritual development independently developed by peoples (groups of peoples), borrowed by them, or imposed upon them through colonization and conquest.

Their presence and distribution, I repeat, turned out to be an important factor in global dynamics, forming alternately changing “centers” of international development: “places” of military, socio-economic and cultural dominance within several geographical regions of one of the local civilizations, the political form of existence of which in most cases was an “empire” - a “universal state” (A. Toynbee), which turned out, depending on its type, to be a more or less successful political means of “remelting” and accelerating the process of integration of linguistically, religiously and culturally different elites and populations of imperial territories. Thus, in parallel and replacing each other as “leaders,” the “Chinese,” “Indian,” “Persian,” “Greco-Roman,” “Arab-Muslim,” “Western European,” and the “Euro-Atlantic” civilizations that grew out of it were formed and developed in the vast expanses of Eurasia, forming corresponding “worlds” and “poles” of regional and interregional development, each of which possessed greater or lesser unifying potential.

Taking this last circumstance into account is of fundamental importance. It emphasizes the limitations of Western-centric interpretations and periodizations of history, which reduce the diversity of past and future specific historical forms of human civilization to only one – the Euro-Atlantic – model of its integration into the pan-human whole – “world civilization.” The interpretation of civilization as Westernization, of course, is in good agreement with a large array of historical facts from the late 19th – mid-20th centuries. But in a long-term historical retrospective and perspective, such an approach cannot be recognized as the only possible one. As A.G. Frank rightly noted, the shift of the “center of the world” is an oscillatory process, marked by “alternating movements relative to an imaginary line that separates East from West in Eurasia”

[21]

. This idea is confirmed by numerous historical-economic and historical-cultural studies by re-orientalist scholars, who convincingly demonstrate that, beginning in the 12th century AD. and until the middle (or end) of the 18th century, the center of commercial, economic, and even industrial progress (until the 16th century) was Asia. The largest empires of this region significantly surpassed any European states in their military power and the extent of their cultural and political influence

[21]

. By the 11th century, the level of education (20-30% of the population) in medieval China was quite high, and the circulation of printed books on history, philosophy, medicine, agriculture, and military affairs grew rapidly. By the 14th century, China had many of the prerequisites for the Industrial Revolution that historians have noted in England in the late 18th century. Researchers believe that this was a "relatively developed market economy," which fostered profit-making and ensured the rapid spread of advanced technology. The agricultural revolution, which occurred in England in the 18th century, occurred in China 700 years earlier, enabling the creation of gigantic cities with populations of over a million.

Nevertheless, victory in the struggle for global domination went to Europe. Beginning in the 16th century, the globalizing drive of the largest nomadic, agrarian-artisanal, and semi-industrial empires of Central and Southeast Asia (China and India) petered out. And from then on, despite the stubborn resistance of the Ottoman-led "Islamic world," for the next four centuries, the "civilization" of humanity went hand in hand with the colonialism of the nation-states of Western Europe and, later, the United States. Their industrial, economic, and military-technical development allowed them to expand their presence in the Americas, Asia, and Africa, imposing the Euro-Atlantic development model on the peoples of these continents. This model is now recognized as dominant and, by many, as the only alternative. But can one assert unequivocally that the future of humanity is tied to the inevitable "Westernization" of the countries of the global "periphery" and "semi-periphery," the result of which will be a "global civilization"?

5. Conclusion

In my opinion, no. In geopolitical and geoeconomic terms, the competition between civilizations for influence, territory, and the resources concentrated therein is analogous to the movement of the "geological plates" of the Earth's crust, the shifting of which determines the dynamics of world history, forming successive "poles of development." Over the past millennium, these have shifted repeatedly, gradually shifting from Asia to Europe. Currently, humanity, from a brief period of dominance by the Euro-Atlantic (Anglo-Saxon) civilization, led by the United States, has returned to a multipolar world. This has been expressed in the revival of the civilizational and national self-awareness of the planet's largest regional powers, who have acutely felt an objective value-based confrontation with the West as special "civilization-states" forced to pursue a policy of "catch-up development" without losing their civilizational identity.

This confrontation has intensified particularly following USA (United States of America) attempts to curb the development of new global centers and the US declaration of a "cold war" against China in 2020, which naturally brought China closer to Russia and increased the chances of implementing another macro-regional project: the creation of a "Russia-India-China" triangle as a tactical diplomatic alliance of three multi-ethnic and multi-religious civilizations whose national interests are not served by the Euro-Atlantic version of globalization. As diplomatic coalitions, alliances have repeatedly proven their effectiveness in the face of conflicting national interests among sovereign states. Let's not forget: although China and India do not have a double-headed eagle on their national emblems, they, like Russia, are looking closely to both the East and the West, seeking short- and long-term benefits for themselves in the face of accelerating global polarization.

Abbreviations

USA	United States of America

Author Contributions

Yuri Granin is the sole author. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Granin, Y. (2026). Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World. Science Frontiers, 7(1), 32-39. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13

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Granin, Y. Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World. Sci. Front. 2026, 7(1), 32-39. doi: 10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13

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Granin Y. Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World. Sci Front. 2026;7(1):32-39. doi: 10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13

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@article{10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13,
  author = {Yuri Granin},
  title = {Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World},
  journal = {Science Frontiers},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {32-39},
  doi = {10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.sf.20260701.13},
  abstract = {The problem of historical dynamics and polarization of the world is discussed in the context of the social evolution of mankind and civilizational analysis of history. The latter is theoretically diverse. It contains two alternative research strategies: universalistic and particularistic. Comparing them, the author proposes to consider the process of "civilizing" countries and peoples in the context of the evolution of communities of the species Homo sapiens and the implementation of a more general macrohistorical trend: the globalization of mankind. It is shown that in this context, the "civilization" of mankind appears as an other being ("its other") of its globalization, realized through a variety of regional socio-cultural forms of embodiment of this general historical trend. The largest and most stable of these forms of human coexistence are "civilizations" and the "development models" they create. In geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects, the competition of civilizations for influence, territories and resources concentrated on them is similar to the movement of the "geological plates" of the earth's crust, the movement of which determines the dynamics of world history, forming successive "poles of development". At present, humanity has returned from a short-lived state of dominance of the Euro-Atlantic (Anglo-Saxon) civilization led by the United States to the state of a multipolar World. This was expressed in the resuscitation of the civilizational and national self-awareness of the largest regional powers of the planet, who acutely felt the objective value-semantic confrontation with the West as special "civilization countries". This and much more stimulated Russia to turn away from the unfriendly West to the South and East.},
 year = {2026}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World
AU  - Yuri Granin
Y1  - 2026/01/27
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13
DO  - 10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13
T2  - Science Frontiers
JF  - Science Frontiers
JO  - Science Frontiers
SP  - 32
EP  - 39
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2994-7030
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13
AB  - The problem of historical dynamics and polarization of the world is discussed in the context of the social evolution of mankind and civilizational analysis of history. The latter is theoretically diverse. It contains two alternative research strategies: universalistic and particularistic. Comparing them, the author proposes to consider the process of "civilizing" countries and peoples in the context of the evolution of communities of the species Homo sapiens and the implementation of a more general macrohistorical trend: the globalization of mankind. It is shown that in this context, the "civilization" of mankind appears as an other being ("its other") of its globalization, realized through a variety of regional socio-cultural forms of embodiment of this general historical trend. The largest and most stable of these forms of human coexistence are "civilizations" and the "development models" they create. In geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects, the competition of civilizations for influence, territories and resources concentrated on them is similar to the movement of the "geological plates" of the earth's crust, the movement of which determines the dynamics of world history, forming successive "poles of development". At present, humanity has returned from a short-lived state of dominance of the Euro-Atlantic (Anglo-Saxon) civilization led by the United States to the state of a multipolar World. This was expressed in the resuscitation of the civilizational and national self-awareness of the largest regional powers of the planet, who acutely felt the objective value-semantic confrontation with the West as special "civilization countries". This and much more stimulated Russia to turn away from the unfriendly West to the South and East.
VL  - 7
IS  - 1
ER  -

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Yuri Granin

Sector of Philosophy of Culture, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

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Granin, Y. (2026). Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World. Science Frontiers, 7(1), 32-39. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13

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Granin, Y. Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World. Sci. Front. 2026, 7(1), 32-39. doi: 10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13

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Granin Y. Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World. Sci Front. 2026;7(1):32-39. doi: 10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13

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@article{10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13,
  author = {Yuri Granin},
  title = {Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World},
  journal = {Science Frontiers},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {32-39},
  doi = {10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.sf.20260701.13},
  abstract = {The problem of historical dynamics and polarization of the world is discussed in the context of the social evolution of mankind and civilizational analysis of history. The latter is theoretically diverse. It contains two alternative research strategies: universalistic and particularistic. Comparing them, the author proposes to consider the process of "civilizing" countries and peoples in the context of the evolution of communities of the species Homo sapiens and the implementation of a more general macrohistorical trend: the globalization of mankind. It is shown that in this context, the "civilization" of mankind appears as an other being ("its other") of its globalization, realized through a variety of regional socio-cultural forms of embodiment of this general historical trend. The largest and most stable of these forms of human coexistence are "civilizations" and the "development models" they create. In geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects, the competition of civilizations for influence, territories and resources concentrated on them is similar to the movement of the "geological plates" of the earth's crust, the movement of which determines the dynamics of world history, forming successive "poles of development". At present, humanity has returned from a short-lived state of dominance of the Euro-Atlantic (Anglo-Saxon) civilization led by the United States to the state of a multipolar World. This was expressed in the resuscitation of the civilizational and national self-awareness of the largest regional powers of the planet, who acutely felt the objective value-semantic confrontation with the West as special "civilization countries". This and much more stimulated Russia to turn away from the unfriendly West to the South and East.},
 year = {2026}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Competition of Civilizational Models of Development as a Factor of Historical Dynamics and Polarization of the World
AU  - Yuri Granin
Y1  - 2026/01/27
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13
DO  - 10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13
T2  - Science Frontiers
JF  - Science Frontiers
JO  - Science Frontiers
SP  - 32
EP  - 39
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2994-7030
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sf.20260701.13
AB  - The problem of historical dynamics and polarization of the world is discussed in the context of the social evolution of mankind and civilizational analysis of history. The latter is theoretically diverse. It contains two alternative research strategies: universalistic and particularistic. Comparing them, the author proposes to consider the process of "civilizing" countries and peoples in the context of the evolution of communities of the species Homo sapiens and the implementation of a more general macrohistorical trend: the globalization of mankind. It is shown that in this context, the "civilization" of mankind appears as an other being ("its other") of its globalization, realized through a variety of regional socio-cultural forms of embodiment of this general historical trend. The largest and most stable of these forms of human coexistence are "civilizations" and the "development models" they create. In geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects, the competition of civilizations for influence, territories and resources concentrated on them is similar to the movement of the "geological plates" of the earth's crust, the movement of which determines the dynamics of world history, forming successive "poles of development". At present, humanity has returned from a short-lived state of dominance of the Euro-Atlantic (Anglo-Saxon) civilization led by the United States to the state of a multipolar World. This was expressed in the resuscitation of the civilizational and national self-awareness of the largest regional powers of the planet, who acutely felt the objective value-semantic confrontation with the West as special "civilization countries". This and much more stimulated Russia to turn away from the unfriendly West to the South and East.
VL  - 7
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download