Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11

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Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro

Published in International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 4, Issue 1)

Received: 19 March 2016 Accepted: 28 March 2016 Published: 21 April 2016

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Abstract

In this paper, we recover the idea cast by Graham Priest to our ears in 2000: That it was possible to experience Ontological Paraconsistency in life. He had, back then, as a translation of his thinking, a painting by Escher: The stairs could be going up or down, and one could not tell where they were going by simply examining the painting. The most obvious argument as to why that was not an instance of Ontological Paraconsistency found in reality was that the perspective from which you would have to stare at the painting to see something different would be different too, so that it was impossible that we were getting up and down at the same time, that is, from the same perspective. That would happen with anything we picked in this world. We recently found something that does not entirely belong to this world, however, something that could finally satisfy the requirements of Priest, and therefore prove to us that there is a place for Ontological Paraconsistency. We observe that the paraconsistent robot, Emmy (Abe et al., 2006), is an application of the Non-ontological Paraconsistency, which we always believed to be passive of existence, but we here talk about another type of paraconsistency, which would be intrinsic to the being. The purpose of this paper is then providing a definite answer to the questions: Is there any real life instance of Ontological Paraconsistency? Is Ontological Paraconsistency a useful concept in terms of logical theories?

Published in	International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 4, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11
Page(s)	1-6
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2016. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Paraconsistency, Priest, Da Costa, Ontological, Tanaka, Non-ontological, Classical Logic, Escher

References

[1]	Exodus 20_24 KJV - An altar of earth thou shalt make unto - Bible Gateway. (n.d.). Retrieved February 29, 2016, from https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus+20:24&version=KJV
[2]	Illusionist.com. (2015). Double Meanings. Retrieved March 26, 2016, from http://www.optical-illusionist.com/category/double-meanings/
[3]	Inácio, J., Torres, C. R., Abe, M., & Filho, D. S. (2006). Robô Móvel Autônomo Emmy (Autonomous Mobile Robot, Emmy): Uma Aplicação eficiente da Lógica Paraconsistente Anotada (An efficient application of the annotated paraconsistent logic), 19–26.
[4]	Kammer, C. (2014). Esher’s impossible stairs inspired by high school stairwell. Retrieved March 26, 2016, from http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/11/16/eschers-impossible-stairs-inspired-by-high-school
[5]	Mark 10_19 KJV - Thou knowest the commandments, Do not - Bible Gateway. (n.d.). Retrieved February 29, 2016, from https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mark+10:19&version=KJV
[6]	Pinheiro, M. R. (2015). (August 2015). The Empire of God. Retrieved February 28, 2016, from http://theempireofgod.blogspot.com.au/2015_08_01_archive.html
[7]	Pinheiro, M. R. (2015b). Words for Science. Indian Journal of Applied Research, 5(5), 19–22. Retrieved from https://www.worldwidejournals.com/ijar/articles.php?val=NjQ0MQ==&b1=853&k=214
[8]	Pinheiro, M. R. (2016). FIRST DECISIONS: NATURE OF THE MODELLING WORK.
[9]	Pixdaus Ltd. (2016). Pixdaus. Retrieved March 26, 2016, from http://pixdaus.com/double-face-photo-by-jdtnt-illusion-appearing-as-two-faces/items/view/579957/
[10]	Priest, G., Tanaka, K., & Weber, Z. (2013). Ecology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/
[11]	RIES RAMON LLULL. (2013). escalator « Bla, bla, bla 3. Retrieved February 27, 2016, from https://1eso1314.wordpress.com/tag/escalator/
[12]	Shivprasad. (2011). Inception and its Inspirations: Esher, Dali and Yoga Vasistha. Retrieved March 26, 2016, from http://www.criticaltwenties.in/philosophyreligionculture/inception-and-its-inspirations-escher-dali-and-yoga-vasistha
[13]	Tanaka, K. (2003). Three Schools of Paraconsistency. Australasian Journal of Logic, 1(1), 28–42. Retrieved from http://philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2003/

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Marcia Ricci Pinheiro. (2016). Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place. International Journal of Philosophy, 4(1), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11

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ACS Style

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro. Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place. Int. J. Philos. 2016, 4(1), 1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11

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AMA Style

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro. Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place. Int J Philos. 2016;4(1):1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11

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@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11,
  author = {Marcia Ricci Pinheiro},
  title = {Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place},
  journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {4},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1-6},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20160401.11},
  abstract = {In this paper, we recover the idea cast by Graham Priest to our ears in 2000: That it was possible to experience Ontological Paraconsistency in life. He had, back then, as a translation of his thinking, a painting by Escher: The stairs could be going up or down, and one could not tell where they were going by simply examining the painting. The most obvious argument as to why that was not an instance of Ontological Paraconsistency found in reality was that the perspective from which you would have to stare at the painting to see something different would be different too, so that it was impossible that we were getting up and down at the same time, that is, from the same perspective. That would happen with anything we picked in this world. We recently found something that does not entirely belong to this world, however, something that could finally satisfy the requirements of Priest, and therefore prove to us that there is a place for Ontological Paraconsistency. We observe that the paraconsistent robot, Emmy (Abe et al., 2006), is an application of the Non-ontological Paraconsistency, which we always believed to be passive of existence, but we here talk about another type of paraconsistency, which would be intrinsic to the being. The purpose of this paper is then providing a definite answer to the questions: Is there any real life instance of Ontological Paraconsistency? Is Ontological Paraconsistency a useful concept in terms of logical theories?},
 year = {2016}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place
AU  - Marcia Ricci Pinheiro
Y1  - 2016/04/21
PY  - 2016
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11
T2  - International Journal of Philosophy
JF  - International Journal of Philosophy
JO  - International Journal of Philosophy
SP  - 1
EP  - 6
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7455
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11
AB  - In this paper, we recover the idea cast by Graham Priest to our ears in 2000: That it was possible to experience Ontological Paraconsistency in life. He had, back then, as a translation of his thinking, a painting by Escher: The stairs could be going up or down, and one could not tell where they were going by simply examining the painting. The most obvious argument as to why that was not an instance of Ontological Paraconsistency found in reality was that the perspective from which you would have to stare at the painting to see something different would be different too, so that it was impossible that we were getting up and down at the same time, that is, from the same perspective. That would happen with anything we picked in this world. We recently found something that does not entirely belong to this world, however, something that could finally satisfy the requirements of Priest, and therefore prove to us that there is a place for Ontological Paraconsistency. We observe that the paraconsistent robot, Emmy (Abe et al., 2006), is an application of the Non-ontological Paraconsistency, which we always believed to be passive of existence, but we here talk about another type of paraconsistency, which would be intrinsic to the being. The purpose of this paper is then providing a definite answer to the questions: Is there any real life instance of Ontological Paraconsistency? Is Ontological Paraconsistency a useful concept in terms of logical theories?
VL  - 4
IS  - 1
ER  -

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Author Information

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro

IICSE University, Wilmington, USA

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro. (2016). Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place. International Journal of Philosophy, 4(1), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11

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ACS Style

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro. Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place. Int. J. Philos. 2016, 4(1), 1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11

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AMA Style

Marcia Ricci Pinheiro. Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place. Int J Philos. 2016;4(1):1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11

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@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11,
  author = {Marcia Ricci Pinheiro},
  title = {Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place},
  journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {4},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1-6},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20160401.11},
  abstract = {In this paper, we recover the idea cast by Graham Priest to our ears in 2000: That it was possible to experience Ontological Paraconsistency in life. He had, back then, as a translation of his thinking, a painting by Escher: The stairs could be going up or down, and one could not tell where they were going by simply examining the painting. The most obvious argument as to why that was not an instance of Ontological Paraconsistency found in reality was that the perspective from which you would have to stare at the painting to see something different would be different too, so that it was impossible that we were getting up and down at the same time, that is, from the same perspective. That would happen with anything we picked in this world. We recently found something that does not entirely belong to this world, however, something that could finally satisfy the requirements of Priest, and therefore prove to us that there is a place for Ontological Paraconsistency. We observe that the paraconsistent robot, Emmy (Abe et al., 2006), is an application of the Non-ontological Paraconsistency, which we always believed to be passive of existence, but we here talk about another type of paraconsistency, which would be intrinsic to the being. The purpose of this paper is then providing a definite answer to the questions: Is there any real life instance of Ontological Paraconsistency? Is Ontological Paraconsistency a useful concept in terms of logical theories?},
 year = {2016}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Ontological Paraconsistency Has a Place
AU  - Marcia Ricci Pinheiro
Y1  - 2016/04/21
PY  - 2016
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11
T2  - International Journal of Philosophy
JF  - International Journal of Philosophy
JO  - International Journal of Philosophy
SP  - 1
EP  - 6
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7455
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20160401.11
AB  - In this paper, we recover the idea cast by Graham Priest to our ears in 2000: That it was possible to experience Ontological Paraconsistency in life. He had, back then, as a translation of his thinking, a painting by Escher: The stairs could be going up or down, and one could not tell where they were going by simply examining the painting. The most obvious argument as to why that was not an instance of Ontological Paraconsistency found in reality was that the perspective from which you would have to stare at the painting to see something different would be different too, so that it was impossible that we were getting up and down at the same time, that is, from the same perspective. That would happen with anything we picked in this world. We recently found something that does not entirely belong to this world, however, something that could finally satisfy the requirements of Priest, and therefore prove to us that there is a place for Ontological Paraconsistency. We observe that the paraconsistent robot, Emmy (Abe et al., 2006), is an application of the Non-ontological Paraconsistency, which we always believed to be passive of existence, but we here talk about another type of paraconsistency, which would be intrinsic to the being. The purpose of this paper is then providing a definite answer to the questions: Is there any real life instance of Ontological Paraconsistency? Is Ontological Paraconsistency a useful concept in terms of logical theories?
VL  - 4
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download