| Peer-Reviewed

An Empirical Analysis of the Degree of Independence and Transparency of Central Bank of Rwanda

Received: 7 October 2017     Accepted: 2 November 2017     Published: 22 December 2017
Views:       Downloads:
Abstract

The aim of this paper is, thus, to evaluate the degree of independence and transparency of the Central Bank of Rwanda. The econometric time series using ARDL model estimated the counterfactual effect of the side effect of the policy from the period of 1980 to 2015. Macroeconomic variables were used to predict each outcome from past inflation, openness, GDP per capita, and various measures of the strength of institutions as explanatory variables. The results showed that inflation and interest rate remained inconclusive to have a long run relationship while the participatory labor rate has a long run relationship with trade openness. In conclusion, the empirical analysis fails to explain the fluctuation in the interest rate or keeping the inflation under control may not mean the low level of independence or transparency from Central Bank of Rwanda.

Published in Journal of Public Policy and Administration (Volume 1, Issue 2)
DOI 10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13
Page(s) 65-69
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2017. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Independence, Transparency, Central Bank, ARDL

References
[1] Primature. Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda. Off Prime Minist Law n° 55/2007 30/11/2007. 2007.
[2] Walsh CE. Central Bank Independence Revisited. Econ Pap A J Appl Econ policy. 2011; 30 (1): 18–22.
[3] Walsh C. Central bank independence, prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary. In: New Palgrave. 2005. p. 1–10.
[4] Mangano G. Measuring central bank independence: a tale of subjectivity and of its consequences. Oxf Econ Pap. 1998; 50 (3): 468–92.
[5] Kydland FE, Prescott EC. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. J Polit Econ. 1977; 85 (3): 473–91.
[6] De Haan J, Kooi W. What really matters: conservativeness or independence? PSL Q Rev. 2013; 50 (200).
[7] Nordhaus WD. The Political Business Cycle. Rev Econ Stud. 1975; 42 (2): 169–90.
[8] Henning CR. Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Peterson Institute for International Economics; 1994.
[9] Waller CJ, Walsh CE. Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths. Am Econ Rev. 1996; 86 (5): 1139–53.
[10] Debelle G, Fischer S. How independent should a central bank be? Conf Ser. 1994; 38 (1977): 195–225.
[11] Bank W. World Development Indicators 2017. The World Bank; 2017.
[12] Oatley TH. Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Corporatism, Partisanship, and Alternative Indices of Central Bank Independence. Public Choice. 1999; 98 (3): 399–413.
[13] Pesaran MH, Shin Y, Smith RJ. Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level relationships. J Appl Econom. 2001; 16 (3): 289–326.
[14] Pesaran, M. H., Shin Y. An autoregressive distributed lag modelling approach to cointegration analysis. In: Econometrics and Economic Theory in the 20th Century: The Ragnar Frisch Centennial Symposium. 1999. p. 1–31.
Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Harerimana Jean de Dieu, Uwacu Florent. (2017). An Empirical Analysis of the Degree of Independence and Transparency of Central Bank of Rwanda. Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 1(2), 65-69. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13

    Copy | Download

    ACS Style

    Harerimana Jean de Dieu; Uwacu Florent. An Empirical Analysis of the Degree of Independence and Transparency of Central Bank of Rwanda. J. Public Policy Adm. 2017, 1(2), 65-69. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13

    Copy | Download

    AMA Style

    Harerimana Jean de Dieu, Uwacu Florent. An Empirical Analysis of the Degree of Independence and Transparency of Central Bank of Rwanda. J Public Policy Adm. 2017;1(2):65-69. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13

    Copy | Download

  • @article{10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13,
      author = {Harerimana Jean de Dieu and Uwacu Florent},
      title = {An Empirical Analysis of the Degree of Independence and Transparency of Central Bank of Rwanda},
      journal = {Journal of Public Policy and Administration},
      volume = {1},
      number = {2},
      pages = {65-69},
      doi = {10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jppa.20170102.13},
      abstract = {The aim of this paper is, thus, to evaluate the degree of independence and transparency of the Central Bank of Rwanda. The econometric time series using ARDL model estimated the counterfactual effect of the side effect of the policy from the period of 1980 to 2015. Macroeconomic variables were used to predict each outcome from past inflation, openness, GDP per capita, and various measures of the strength of institutions as explanatory variables. The results showed that inflation and interest rate remained inconclusive to have a long run relationship while the participatory labor rate has a long run relationship with trade openness. In conclusion, the empirical analysis fails to explain the fluctuation in the interest rate or keeping the inflation under control may not mean the low level of independence or transparency from Central Bank of Rwanda.},
     year = {2017}
    }
    

    Copy | Download

  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - An Empirical Analysis of the Degree of Independence and Transparency of Central Bank of Rwanda
    AU  - Harerimana Jean de Dieu
    AU  - Uwacu Florent
    Y1  - 2017/12/22
    PY  - 2017
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13
    DO  - 10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13
    T2  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
    JF  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
    JO  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
    SP  - 65
    EP  - 69
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2640-2696
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20170102.13
    AB  - The aim of this paper is, thus, to evaluate the degree of independence and transparency of the Central Bank of Rwanda. The econometric time series using ARDL model estimated the counterfactual effect of the side effect of the policy from the period of 1980 to 2015. Macroeconomic variables were used to predict each outcome from past inflation, openness, GDP per capita, and various measures of the strength of institutions as explanatory variables. The results showed that inflation and interest rate remained inconclusive to have a long run relationship while the participatory labor rate has a long run relationship with trade openness. In conclusion, the empirical analysis fails to explain the fluctuation in the interest rate or keeping the inflation under control may not mean the low level of independence or transparency from Central Bank of Rwanda.
    VL  - 1
    IS  - 2
    ER  - 

    Copy | Download

Author Information
  • School of Economics, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

  • School of Economics, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

  • Sections