The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance
International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems
Volume 4, Issue 1, March 2018, Pages: 1-6
Received: Dec. 26, 2017; Accepted: Jan. 23, 2018; Published: Feb. 11, 2018
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Authors
Wang Ping, School of Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an, China
Wang Jing, School of Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an, China
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Abstract
With the aging problem aggravated gradually, the pension problem has aroused the concern of many scholars and it become a very unique social problem in china. In the future development, the way to solve the aging problem will be largely through the way of pension insurance. Based on the large difference in China region, this paper chooses the rural areas with more serious aging problems, and uses the game theory to establish the complete information static game to discuss the game relationship between the government and the individual in the rural endowment insurance. Finally, on the basis of certain assumptions, a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance is established, and this paper solve the Nash equilibrium (solution) and utility of the game model in the range of ZZ (the government's profit value when the government chooses to provide the strategy) and the GG (personal benefit value of the individual's choice of payment strategy). Finally, this paper discusses the assumptions and gives the prospect to the further development of the model.
Keywords
Pension Problem, Rural Endowment Insurance, Complete Information Static Game, Nash Equilibrium
To cite this article
Wang Ping, Wang Jing, The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance, International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems. Vol. 4, No. 1, 2018, pp. 1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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