Analysis on “Collusion”: The Possibility of a New Type of Rent-seeking in the Separation System of Education Powers in China
Higher Education Research
Volume 4, Issue 4, August 2019, Pages: 61-66
Received: Aug. 27, 2019;
Accepted: Sep. 12, 2019;
Published: Oct. 2, 2019
Views 78 Downloads 14
Yangchun Sun, Graduate School of Education, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
Anqi Xu, Graduate School of Education, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
Identifying and avoiding education rent-seeking is an important issue in improving the structure of education governance and establishing a modern education governance system. By using critical discourse analysis, his study attempts to explore rent-seeking within education powers under the separation system.“Collusion” is a new type of rent-seeking in education powers under the background of the separation of supervision, running and evaluation.Once it happens, it will bring serious hazards in governance.Moreover, collusion is overlooked easily.Previous research on education rent-seeking was mostly concentrated on rent-seeking of “monopoly power”; However, far too little attention has been paid to the rent-seeking of “union power” that may appear in the separation system of supervision, running and evaluation.Collusion is also known as conspiracy and complicity. The study found that the forms of collusion in education include the collusion between running and evaluation and the collusion between supervision and running.The“essence”of education collusion is to seek union rent in a more subtle form.Collusion in education may generate “potential hazards”of disrupting the cooperative order of honesty and trustworthiness, reducing the level of interaction and cooperation, gaining the short-term union but damaging the public interest ultimately, thus causing serious threats to the “benign interaction among supervision, running and evaluation”.
Analysis on “Collusion”: The Possibility of a New Type of Rent-seeking in the Separation System of Education Powers in China, Higher Education Research.
Vol. 4, No. 4,
2019, pp. 61-66.
Jian-Bing LUO. Generation and Checks and Balances of Collusion [M]. An Hui: Hefei University of Technology Press, 2008: 18.
Stigler, G. J. The Free Riders and Collective Action: An Approach to the Theories of Economic Regulation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1974, 5 (2): 360.
Tirole, J. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizatio [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, ＆Organization, 1986, 2 (2).
Tirole, J. Collusion and the Theory of Organizations [M]//Tirole, J., ＆Laffont J. J. Advances in Economic Theory: Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 71.
Villadsen, B. Communication and Delegation in Collusive Agencies [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1995, 19 (2): 335.
Guang-Yong LEI. Economic Analysis of Audit Collusion [J]. Journal of Audit & Economics, 1999 (2): 23.
Hui-Hua NIE, Jin-bo LI. Collusions between Governments and Firms and Economic Development [J]. China Economic Quarterly，2007 (1): 75.
Li-Long HE, Zhong-Wei CHEN, Jie ZHANG. Collusion and Supervision in Environmental Pollution: A Game Analysis [J]. Qinghai Social Sciences, 2009 (1): 33.
Laffont, J. J.,Martimort, D. Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation [J]. Econometrica, 2000, 68 (2): 315.
Acton, J. E., Himmelfarb, G. Essays on Freedom and Power [M]. Ohio: World Publishing Company, 1955: 556.
Krueger, A. O. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society [J]. American Economic Review, 1974: 64 (3): 291.
Chamberlin, E., Jia-Lin GUO. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition [M]. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1958: 63.
Tullock, G. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft [J]. Economic Inquiry, 1967, 5 (3).
Harberger, A. C. Monopoly and Resource Allocation [J]. American Economic Review, 1954, 44 (2): 78.
Li WANG, Shan-mai WANG. Behavior Analysis of School Rent-seeking Subjects in Compulsory Education [J]. Education Science, 2005 (6): 6.
Bao-Wei HAO, Ya-Qing MAO. Rent- Seeking in Higher Education [J]. Tsinghua Journal of Education, 2006 (5): 21.
Feng-E WANG, Ke-Rui YANG. Public Power and Education Rent-seeking [J]. Contemporary Education Sciences, 2007 (11): 12.
Connolly, R. A., Hirsch, B. T., Hirschey, M. Union Rent Seeking, Intangible Capital, and Market Value of the Firm [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1986, 68 (4): 567.
Hirsch, B. T. Market Structure, Union Rent Seeking, and Firm Profitability [J]. conomics Letters, 2004, 32 (1): 75.
Hart, O., Moore, J. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm [J]. ournal of Political Economy, 1990, 98 (6): 1142.
Grossman,S., Hart, O. D. The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94 (4): 691.
Kreps, D. M., Wilson, R. Reputation and Imperfect Information [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982，27 (2): 256.
Chun-Hui GAN, Yu-Lin YAO. The Frontier of Strategic Behavior: A Survey [J]. hina Industrial Economics, 2005 (11): 118.
Salop,S., Scheffman, D. T. Raising Rivals’Costs [J]. American Economic Review, 1983, 73 (2): 267.
Hai-Tao ZHOU. Separating the Government Authorities, Management and Assessment in Higher Education: Reasons and Approaches [J]. ournal of National Academy of Education Administration, 2014 (3): 5.
Xiao-Bing SUN. Promote the Separation of Supervision, Running and Evaluation, and Build a New Pattern of Education Public Governance [J]. hina Higher Education, 2015 (20): 9.
Xi-Ping HAN, Hai-Long QU. Features, Reasons and Solutions of Rent-seeking in Education [J]. ournal of Northeast Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 2014 (4): 153.
Xiao-Ming ZHANG. Rent-seeking and Regulation of Higher Education-Also on the Reform of University Governance in China [J]. hina Adult Education, 2015 (3): 12.
Duan-Wu TU. Power Structure Evolution in the Transformation of Chinese Higher Education Administration System [J]. Modern University Education, 2006 (1).
Stigler, G J, Zhen-Min PAN. The Organization of Industry [M]. hanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing Press, 1996: 90.
Akerlof, G., Yellen, J. . The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment [J]. uarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, 105 (2): 268.
Laffont, J J, Tirole J. ei SHI. Incentive Theory in Government Procurement and Regulation [M]. hanghai: Truth & Wisdom Press, 2014: 451.
Ze-Yun LIU. An empirical analysis on the effort to fund education of Chinese government during the Ninth Five-Year Plan [J]. Journal of Higher Education, 2003 (2): 61.
Hui-Min QIN, Cheng YANG. The Effort to Fund Higher Education of Local Government [J]. Journal of National Academy of Education Administration，2013 (7): 73.
Quan-Zhi YAN, Qian-Qian ZHANG. Empirical Study on the Effort to Fund Higher Education of Provincial Government [J]. Education & Economy, 2010 (3): 17.
Olson, M, Yu CHEN. The Logic of Collective Action [M]. hanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing Press, 1995: 14.
Feintuck, M.,Xin DAI. The Public interest’ in Regulation [M]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2014: 3.
Feng YANG. A Normative Analysis of Government Supervision: A Review of Traditional Public Interest Theory and Its Policy Application [J]. Economic Review Journal, 2007 (12): 78.
Fu-Liang CHEN. Government Rules: Views and Comments on Public Interest Theory and Sector Interest Theory [J]. ournal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2001 (1): 21.
Feng YANG. Departmental Interest Theory and New Regulation Economics [J]. ianghuai Tribune, 2008 (5): 5.
Dong-Chuan SUN, Fei YE. The Research for the Negotiation Model about the Benefit Allocation of the Dynamic Alliance [J]. cience Research Management, 2001 (2): 91.
Le-Bin XING, Xu WANG, Hong-Bin XU. Research on Risk Compensation of Benefit Distribution of Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance [J]. tatistics & Decision, 2010 (14): 63.
Berle, A.,Means, G. C. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. ew York: MacMillan.