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The Research of Corporate Governance, Industrial Over-investment and Corporate Over-investment
Journal of Investment and Management
Volume 6, Issue 1, February 2017, Pages: 56-59
Received: Jun. 6, 2017; Published: Jun. 6, 2017
Views 2097      Downloads 154
Authors
Su-yuan Tian, The School of Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, P. R. China
Ping Ye, The School of Business, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, P. R. China
Ke Gao, The School of Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, P. R. China
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Abstract
The corporate governance of listed companies is the focus and hot spot of financial research in recent years. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China for the period 2003-2015, the paper investigates corporate governance on the relationship between industrial over-investment and the over-investment. The results show that: (1) The information transparency restrains the positive relationship between industrial over-investment and the next period of over-investment. (2) Major shareholder increases the positive relationship between industrial over-investment and the over-investment.
Keywords
Over-investment, Industrial Over-investment, Information Transparency, Major Shareholder
To cite this article
Su-yuan Tian, Ping Ye, Ke Gao, The Research of Corporate Governance, Industrial Over-investment and Corporate Over-investment, Journal of Investment and Management. Vol. 6, No. 1, 2017, pp. 56-59. doi: 10.11648/j.jim.20170601.19
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