Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions

Hua Jinliang

doi:doi:10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11

| Peer-Reviewed

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions

Hua Jinliang

Published in Economics (Volume 6, Issue 5)

Received: 17 August 2017 Accepted: 30 September 2017 Published: 7 November 2017

Views: Downloads:

Download PDF

Share This Article

Twitter
Linked In
Facebook

Abstract

The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and financial institutions are a process of repeated game, but the research on them is still in a superficial stage. Therefore, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and method to analyze the dynamic replication system of asymmetric evolutionary game of two groups of financial institutions and regulators in China. And the evolutionary stable state of the system under different conditions is analyzed. The conclusion is that under different parameter values, the other side adopts different strategies, and the system will tend to different equilibrium states.

Published in	Economics (Volume 6, Issue 5)
DOI	10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
Page(s)	51-57
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Financial Innovation, Financial Regulation, Evolutionary Game

References

[1]	Bhattacharyya and Nanda, “Client discretion, switching costs, and financial innovation,” Review of Financial Studies, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1101-1102, 2000.
[2]	Liu yanping, “Game analysis of legal system of financial innovation and financial supervision,” northern trade and economic cooperation, no.7, pp. 115-116, 2016.
[3]	Zhang Meng, “research on financial innovation and risk supervision in the background of post financial crisis,” financial forum, no.9, pp. 93-94, 2017.
[4]	Yin Long, “Development of financial innovation theory and evolution of financial supervision system,” finance research, no.3, pp. 12-13, 2005.
[5]	Li shusheng and Qi jingyu, “See the dialectical relationship between financial innovation and financial supervision from the US subprime mortgage crisis,” Research on economics and management, no.7, pp.13-15, 2008.
[6]	Liu yanyan, “Financial innovation and financial regulation: from the perspective of shadow banking,” financial management, no.3, pp. 47-49, 2014.
[7]	Kim T, Koo B and Park M, “Role of financial regulation and innovation in the financial crisis,” Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 662-672, 2013.
[8]	Cao Dong, CaoWei and Wu junlong, “Game Study on financial innovation and supervision in the Internet era,” Journal of Southeast University, no. 7, pp. 63-68, 2014.
[9]	Peng hongfeng and Yang liuming, “Research on the relationship between financial innovation and incentive regulation based on Evolutionary Game,” Journal of central finance and Economics, no. 9, pp. 36-38, 2016.
[10]	Deng Yang, “Game Analysis of financial supervision and financial innovation in the post financial crisis era, finance and taxation, no. 1, pp. 41-43, 2015.
[11]	Zhang zhiyuan, “Game Study on financial supervision and financial risk in the post financial crisis era,” Beijing: Economic Science Press, 2015.
[12]	Yu guanghe, “A study of the relationship between financial innovation and financial supervision -- an analysis based on Information Economics,” no. 9, pp. 35-37, 2011.

Cite This Article

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Hua Jinliang. (2017). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions. Economics, 6(5), 51-57. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Hua Jinliang. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions. Economics. 2017, 6(5), 51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Hua Jinliang. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions. Economics. 2017;6(5):51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11,
  author = {Hua Jinliang},
  title = {Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions},
  journal = {Economics},
  volume = {6},
  number = {5},
  pages = {51-57},
  doi = {10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.eco.20170605.11},
  abstract = {The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and financial institutions are a process of repeated game, but the research on them is still in a superficial stage. Therefore, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and method to analyze the dynamic replication system of asymmetric evolutionary game of two groups of financial institutions and regulators in China. And the evolutionary stable state of the system under different conditions is analyzed. The conclusion is that under different parameter values, the other side adopts different strategies, and the system will tend to different equilibrium states.},
 year = {2017}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions
AU  - Hua Jinliang
Y1  - 2017/11/07
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
T2  - Economics
JF  - Economics
JO  - Economics
SP  - 51
EP  - 57
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2376-6603
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
AB  - The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and financial institutions are a process of repeated game, but the research on them is still in a superficial stage. Therefore, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and method to analyze the dynamic replication system of asymmetric evolutionary game of two groups of financial institutions and regulators in China. And the evolutionary stable state of the system under different conditions is analyzed. The conclusion is that under different parameter values, the other side adopts different strategies, and the system will tend to different equilibrium states.
VL  - 6
IS  - 5
ER  -

Copy | Download

Author Information

Hua Jinliang

Shanghai Research Institute, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China

Download PDF

Sections

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Hua Jinliang. (2017). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions. Economics, 6(5), 51-57. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Hua Jinliang. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions. Economics. 2017, 6(5), 51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Hua Jinliang. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions. Economics. 2017;6(5):51-57. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11,
  author = {Hua Jinliang},
  title = {Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions},
  journal = {Economics},
  volume = {6},
  number = {5},
  pages = {51-57},
  doi = {10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.eco.20170605.11},
  abstract = {The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and financial institutions are a process of repeated game, but the research on them is still in a superficial stage. Therefore, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and method to analyze the dynamic replication system of asymmetric evolutionary game of two groups of financial institutions and regulators in China. And the evolutionary stable state of the system under different conditions is analyzed. The conclusion is that under different parameter values, the other side adopts different strategies, and the system will tend to different equilibrium states.},
 year = {2017}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions
AU  - Hua Jinliang
Y1  - 2017/11/07
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
T2  - Economics
JF  - Economics
JO  - Economics
SP  - 51
EP  - 57
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2376-6603
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20170605.11
AB  - The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and financial institutions are a process of repeated game, but the research on them is still in a superficial stage. Therefore, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and method to analyze the dynamic replication system of asymmetric evolutionary game of two groups of financial institutions and regulators in China. And the evolutionary stable state of the system under different conditions is analyzed. The conclusion is that under different parameter values, the other side adopts different strategies, and the system will tend to different equilibrium states.
VL  - 6
IS  - 5
ER  -

Copy | Download