The Relationship Between Financial Connections and Business Performance of Private Enterprises: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
Volume 7, Issue 1, February 2019, Pages: 29-36
Received: Jan. 10, 2019;
Accepted: Mar. 12, 2019;
Published: Mar. 29, 2019
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Zhuwei Li, Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
Sennan Liu, Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
Shunyao Wang, Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
Baolu Wang, Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
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Sample data were acquired from Chinese listed private enterprises. Then, the random effect model of panel data was used to establish a regression model of business performance and firm financial connection and examine the relationship between them. Results showed that the higher the degree of private enterprise financial connection, the worse the business performance of the enterprise. In other words, financial connection provides financing convenience, but it cannot improve business efficiency. We also classified the sample enterprises according to size and found that financial connection has a greater negative impact on the performance of small-scale firms compared with large-scale ones. Moreover, dividing the sample enterprises according to the degree of financial marketization in the location of the sample enterprises indicated that financial connection has a negative effect on the performance of private enterprises in areas with low degree of financial marketization. The classification of financial connection also revealed that non-bank financial connection exerts a greater negative impact on corporate performance than bank financial connection.
Financial Connection, Business Performance, Private Enterprise, Panel Data
To cite this article
The Relationship Between Financial Connections and Business Performance of Private Enterprises: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms, International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences.
Vol. 7, No. 1,
2019, pp. 29-36.
Copyright © 2019 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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