Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy; Maria A. Nastych

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11

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Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Maria A. Nastych

Published in International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (Volume 1, Issue 2)

Received: 15 April 2013 Accepted: Published: 10 June 2013

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Abstract

Study of the formation and subsequent behavior of the companies’ coalitions are becoming increasingly important in today's economy. In the elementary case, the process of collaboration may be represented as a classical cooperative game with transferable utility. However, the assumption of the possibility of describing the potential winnings of coalitions using deterministic values seems very controversial. Hypothesis of their random nature is much more realistic. The paper presents the conversion from classical cooperative game theory with side-payments to stochastic analog. Game theory modeling of mergers and acquisitions processes is based on this class of games here.

Published in	International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (Volume 1, Issue 2)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11
Page(s)	20-26
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Cooperative Game Theory, Stochastics, VaR, Mergers and Acquisitions, Quantile

References

[1]	Suijs, Jeroen, and Peter Borm. "Stochastic cooperative games: superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents." Games and Economic Behavior 27.2 (1999): 331-345.
[2]	Конюховский, П. В., "Применение стохастических кооперативных игр при обосновании инвестиционных проектов," Вестник СПбГУ. 2012, Сер, 5(4), pp.134-143.
[3]	Gibbons, Robert, "Game theory for applied economists," Princeton University Press, 1992
[4]	Печерский, С. Л., and А. А. Беляева, "Теория игр для экономистов." СПб: Изд-во Европейского университета в С.-Петербурге, 2001.
[5]	Jorion, Philippe, "Value at risk: the new benchmark for managing financial risk," Vol. 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007.
[6]	Koller, Tim, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels. "Valuation: measuring and managing the value of companies." Vol. 499. Wiley, 2010.
[7]	Валдайцев, С.В., "Оценка бизнеса и управления стоимостью предприятия", Экономика, 1, 2. М.: Проспект, 2012.
[8]	Moulin, H., "Fair division and collective welfare." London, England.: The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004.
[9]	Damodaran, A., "Applied Corporate Finance" (3d ed.). Wiley, 2010.
[10]	Brealey, Richard A., Stewart C. Myers, and Franklin Allen, "Corporate finance," Vol. 8. McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2006.

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Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Maria A. Nastych. (2013). Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games. International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1(2), 20-26. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11

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ACS Style

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy; Maria A. Nastych. Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games. Int. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2013, 1(2), 20-26. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11

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AMA Style

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Maria A. Nastych. Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games. Int J Econ Behav Organ. 2013;1(2):20-26. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11

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@article{10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11,
  author = {Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy and Maria A. Nastych},
  title = {Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games},
  journal = {International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  volume = {1},
  number = {2},
  pages = {20-26},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijebo.20130102.11},
  abstract = {Study of the formation and subsequent behavior of the companies’ coalitions are becoming increasingly important in today's economy. In the elementary case, the process of collaboration may be represented as a classical cooperative game with transferable utility. However, the assumption of the possibility of describing the potential winnings of coalitions using deterministic values seems very controversial. Hypothesis of their random nature is much more realistic. The paper presents the conversion from classical cooperative game theory with side-payments to stochastic analog. Game theory modeling of mergers and acquisitions processes is based on this class of games here.},
 year = {2013}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games
AU  - Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy
AU  - Maria A. Nastych
Y1  - 2013/06/10
PY  - 2013
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11
T2  - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF  - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JO  - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SP  - 20
EP  - 26
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-7616
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11
AB  - Study of the formation and subsequent behavior of the companies’ coalitions are becoming increasingly important in today's economy. In the elementary case, the process of collaboration may be represented as a classical cooperative game with transferable utility. However, the assumption of the possibility of describing the potential winnings of coalitions using deterministic values seems very controversial. Hypothesis of their random nature is much more realistic. The paper presents the conversion from classical cooperative game theory with side-payments to stochastic analog. Game theory modeling of mergers and acquisitions processes is based on this class of games here.
VL  - 1
IS  - 2
ER  -

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Author Information

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy

Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
Maria A. Nastych

Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia

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APA Style

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Maria A. Nastych. (2013). Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games. International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1(2), 20-26. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11

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ACS Style

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy; Maria A. Nastych. Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games. Int. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2013, 1(2), 20-26. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11

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AMA Style

Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy, Maria A. Nastych. Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games. Int J Econ Behav Organ. 2013;1(2):20-26. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11,
  author = {Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy and Maria A. Nastych},
  title = {Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games},
  journal = {International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  volume = {1},
  number = {2},
  pages = {20-26},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijebo.20130102.11},
  abstract = {Study of the formation and subsequent behavior of the companies’ coalitions are becoming increasingly important in today's economy. In the elementary case, the process of collaboration may be represented as a classical cooperative game with transferable utility. However, the assumption of the possibility of describing the potential winnings of coalitions using deterministic values seems very controversial. Hypothesis of their random nature is much more realistic. The paper presents the conversion from classical cooperative game theory with side-payments to stochastic analog. Game theory modeling of mergers and acquisitions processes is based on this class of games here.},
 year = {2013}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Mergers and Acquisitions Stochastic Cooperative Games
AU  - Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy
AU  - Maria A. Nastych
Y1  - 2013/06/10
PY  - 2013
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11
T2  - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF  - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JO  - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SP  - 20
EP  - 26
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-7616
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.20130102.11
AB  - Study of the formation and subsequent behavior of the companies’ coalitions are becoming increasingly important in today's economy. In the elementary case, the process of collaboration may be represented as a classical cooperative game with transferable utility. However, the assumption of the possibility of describing the potential winnings of coalitions using deterministic values seems very controversial. Hypothesis of their random nature is much more realistic. The paper presents the conversion from classical cooperative game theory with side-payments to stochastic analog. Game theory modeling of mergers and acquisitions processes is based on this class of games here.
VL  - 1
IS  - 2
ER  -

Copy | Download