Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory

Rubing Liu; Yuyu Zhang; Teng Lin

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12

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Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory

Rubing Liu, Yuyu Zhang, Teng Lin

Published in Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 8, Issue 3)

Received: 1 April 2020 Accepted: 23 April 2020 Published: 14 May 2020

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Abstract

The establishment of central environmental supervision system (CESS) and the departure audits of outgoing local government officials are major environmental initiatives established by the Chinese government during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Their aim is to separate the different environmental responsibilities of the local and central governments. In just one year, central environmental supervisors inspected 30 provinces’ and cities’ environmental performance and punished many local officials for their failures to fulfil their environmental responsibility as part of a national pollution crackdown. Inspired by the significant and profound effects of the environmental audits, we construct a tripartite game model involving the central auditors, environmental whistle-blowers and local government officials. We show that local government officials are more likely to act responsibly and that auditors adopt more detailed auditing procedures due to the involvement of whistle-blowers. This suggests that the central environmental supervision system must be institutionalised, legalised, normalised and focus on protections for whistle-blowers. Environmental audits are useful for focusing on departing officials’ accountability for environmental protection. We urge the government to strengthen the transparency of audit and to distribute environmental audit information on social media.

Published in	Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 8, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12
Page(s)	115-124
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Environmental Audit, Environmental Responsibility, Environmental Whistle-blowing, Whistle-blower Protection System, Cooperative Governance, Tripartite Game Analysis

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APA Style

Rubing Liu, Yuyu Zhang, Teng Lin. (2020). Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 8(3), 115-124. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12

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ACS Style

Rubing Liu; Yuyu Zhang; Teng Lin. Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory. J. Finance Account. 2020, 8(3), 115-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12

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AMA Style

Rubing Liu, Yuyu Zhang, Teng Lin. Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory. J Finance Account. 2020;8(3):115-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12

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@article{10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12,
  author = {Rubing Liu and Yuyu Zhang and Teng Lin},
  title = {Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory},
  journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {115-124},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20200803.12},
  abstract = {The establishment of central environmental supervision system (CESS) and the departure audits of outgoing local government officials are major environmental initiatives established by the Chinese government during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Their aim is to separate the different environmental responsibilities of the local and central governments. In just one year, central environmental supervisors inspected 30 provinces’ and cities’ environmental performance and punished many local officials for their failures to fulfil their environmental responsibility as part of a national pollution crackdown. Inspired by the significant and profound effects of the environmental audits, we construct a tripartite game model involving the central auditors, environmental whistle-blowers and local government officials. We show that local government officials are more likely to act responsibly and that auditors adopt more detailed auditing procedures due to the involvement of whistle-blowers. This suggests that the central environmental supervision system must be institutionalised, legalised, normalised and focus on protections for whistle-blowers. Environmental audits are useful for focusing on departing officials’ accountability for environmental protection. We urge the government to strengthen the transparency of audit and to distribute environmental audit information on social media.},
 year = {2020}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory
AU  - Rubing Liu
AU  - Yuyu Zhang
AU  - Teng Lin
Y1  - 2020/05/14
PY  - 2020
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12
T2  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JF  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JO  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
SP  - 115
EP  - 124
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7323
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12
AB  - The establishment of central environmental supervision system (CESS) and the departure audits of outgoing local government officials are major environmental initiatives established by the Chinese government during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Their aim is to separate the different environmental responsibilities of the local and central governments. In just one year, central environmental supervisors inspected 30 provinces’ and cities’ environmental performance and punished many local officials for their failures to fulfil their environmental responsibility as part of a national pollution crackdown. Inspired by the significant and profound effects of the environmental audits, we construct a tripartite game model involving the central auditors, environmental whistle-blowers and local government officials. We show that local government officials are more likely to act responsibly and that auditors adopt more detailed auditing procedures due to the involvement of whistle-blowers. This suggests that the central environmental supervision system must be institutionalised, legalised, normalised and focus on protections for whistle-blowers. Environmental audits are useful for focusing on departing officials’ accountability for environmental protection. We urge the government to strengthen the transparency of audit and to distribute environmental audit information on social media.
VL  - 8
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Rubing Liu

School of Accounting/Audit Governnance and Risk Control Research Center, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China
Yuyu Zhang

School of Accountancy, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
Teng Lin

School of Accounting/Audit Governnance and Risk Control Research Center, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Rubing Liu, Yuyu Zhang, Teng Lin. (2020). Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 8(3), 115-124. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12

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ACS Style

Rubing Liu; Yuyu Zhang; Teng Lin. Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory. J. Finance Account. 2020, 8(3), 115-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12

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AMA Style

Rubing Liu, Yuyu Zhang, Teng Lin. Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory. J Finance Account. 2020;8(3):115-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12,
  author = {Rubing Liu and Yuyu Zhang and Teng Lin},
  title = {Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory},
  journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {115-124},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20200803.12},
  abstract = {The establishment of central environmental supervision system (CESS) and the departure audits of outgoing local government officials are major environmental initiatives established by the Chinese government during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Their aim is to separate the different environmental responsibilities of the local and central governments. In just one year, central environmental supervisors inspected 30 provinces’ and cities’ environmental performance and punished many local officials for their failures to fulfil their environmental responsibility as part of a national pollution crackdown. Inspired by the significant and profound effects of the environmental audits, we construct a tripartite game model involving the central auditors, environmental whistle-blowers and local government officials. We show that local government officials are more likely to act responsibly and that auditors adopt more detailed auditing procedures due to the involvement of whistle-blowers. This suggests that the central environmental supervision system must be institutionalised, legalised, normalised and focus on protections for whistle-blowers. Environmental audits are useful for focusing on departing officials’ accountability for environmental protection. We urge the government to strengthen the transparency of audit and to distribute environmental audit information on social media.},
 year = {2020}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Central Environmental Supervisors and Departure Audits of Outgoing Local Government Officials’ Environmental Accountability: An Analysis Based on Game Theory
AU  - Rubing Liu
AU  - Yuyu Zhang
AU  - Teng Lin
Y1  - 2020/05/14
PY  - 2020
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12
T2  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JF  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JO  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
SP  - 115
EP  - 124
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7323
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20200803.12
AB  - The establishment of central environmental supervision system (CESS) and the departure audits of outgoing local government officials are major environmental initiatives established by the Chinese government during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Their aim is to separate the different environmental responsibilities of the local and central governments. In just one year, central environmental supervisors inspected 30 provinces’ and cities’ environmental performance and punished many local officials for their failures to fulfil their environmental responsibility as part of a national pollution crackdown. Inspired by the significant and profound effects of the environmental audits, we construct a tripartite game model involving the central auditors, environmental whistle-blowers and local government officials. We show that local government officials are more likely to act responsibly and that auditors adopt more detailed auditing procedures due to the involvement of whistle-blowers. This suggests that the central environmental supervision system must be institutionalised, legalised, normalised and focus on protections for whistle-blowers. Environmental audits are useful for focusing on departing officials’ accountability for environmental protection. We urge the government to strengthen the transparency of audit and to distribute environmental audit information on social media.
VL  - 8
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download