An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries

Gilberto Crispim; Marcus Craig Rodrigs; Luiz Alberton

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15

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An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries

Gilberto Crispim, Marcus Craig Rodrigs, Luiz Alberton

Published in Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 11, Issue 3)

Received: 30 January 2023 Accepted: 2 March 2023 Published: 27 June 2023

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Abstract

Considering the new wave of discussion on the expenses made during electoral periods in democratic governments in specialized literature, in which governments stimulate the economy in election years to prospect votes and stay in power, concentrating greater spending on media actions to influence voters in choosing their vote, this study explores the Political Budget Cycles (PBC) and their contributions during the presidential election period, in the governments of the Americas from 1990 to 2019, with the objective of identifying the impact on spending on education (SU), health (HEA), national security (NS), transportation and communication (TC), as well as on the budget deficit (BD), budget surplus (BS), gross domestic product (GDP), human development index (HDI), and unemployment rate (UR). This was done using the random effects statistical method of tobit regression for pooled panel data on expenditures incurred in the 37 American countries. The results are robust and diverge from other studies, as also show that the investigated expenditures do not undergo significant changes in the election period, as suggested by other studies, and that the presence of Political Budget Cycles in democratic countries contributes positively to the economic and human development of these countries located in the Americas.

Published in	Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 11, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15
Page(s)	95-106
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Political Budget Cycles, Panel Data, Presidential Election

References

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APA Style

Gilberto Crispim, Marcus Craig Rodrigs, Luiz Alberton. (2023). An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 11(3), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15

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Gilberto Crispim; Marcus Craig Rodrigs; Luiz Alberton. An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries. J. Finance Account. 2023, 11(3), 95-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15

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AMA Style

Gilberto Crispim, Marcus Craig Rodrigs, Luiz Alberton. An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries. J Finance Account. 2023;11(3):95-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15

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@article{10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15,
  author = {Gilberto Crispim and Marcus Craig Rodrigs and Luiz Alberton},
  title = {An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries},
  journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
  volume = {11},
  number = {3},
  pages = {95-106},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20231103.15},
  abstract = {Considering the new wave of discussion on the expenses made during electoral periods in democratic governments in specialized literature, in which governments stimulate the economy in election years to prospect votes and stay in power, concentrating greater spending on media actions to influence voters in choosing their vote, this study explores the Political Budget Cycles (PBC) and their contributions during the presidential election period, in the governments of the Americas from 1990 to 2019, with the objective of identifying the impact on spending on education (SU), health (HEA), national security (NS), transportation and communication (TC), as well as on the budget deficit (BD), budget surplus (BS), gross domestic product (GDP), human development index (HDI), and unemployment rate (UR). This was done using the random effects statistical method of tobit regression for pooled panel data on expenditures incurred in the 37 American countries. The results are robust and diverge from other studies, as also show that the investigated expenditures do not undergo significant changes in the election period, as suggested by other studies, and that the presence of Political Budget Cycles in democratic countries contributes positively to the economic and human development of these countries located in the Americas.},
 year = {2023}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries
AU  - Gilberto Crispim
AU  - Marcus Craig Rodrigs
AU  - Luiz Alberton
Y1  - 2023/06/27
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15
DO  - 10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15
T2  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JF  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JO  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
SP  - 95
EP  - 106
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7323
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15
AB  - Considering the new wave of discussion on the expenses made during electoral periods in democratic governments in specialized literature, in which governments stimulate the economy in election years to prospect votes and stay in power, concentrating greater spending on media actions to influence voters in choosing their vote, this study explores the Political Budget Cycles (PBC) and their contributions during the presidential election period, in the governments of the Americas from 1990 to 2019, with the objective of identifying the impact on spending on education (SU), health (HEA), national security (NS), transportation and communication (TC), as well as on the budget deficit (BD), budget surplus (BS), gross domestic product (GDP), human development index (HDI), and unemployment rate (UR). This was done using the random effects statistical method of tobit regression for pooled panel data on expenditures incurred in the 37 American countries. The results are robust and diverge from other studies, as also show that the investigated expenditures do not undergo significant changes in the election period, as suggested by other studies, and that the presence of Political Budget Cycles in democratic countries contributes positively to the economic and human development of these countries located in the Americas.
VL  - 11
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Gilberto Crispim

Special Academic Unit Applied Social Sciences, Federal University of Goias, Goias, Brazil
Marcus Craig Rodrigs

Faculty of Business and Law, The University of Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia
Luiz Alberton

Accounting Faculty, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil

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APA Style

Gilberto Crispim, Marcus Craig Rodrigs, Luiz Alberton. (2023). An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 11(3), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15

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ACS Style

Gilberto Crispim; Marcus Craig Rodrigs; Luiz Alberton. An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries. J. Finance Account. 2023, 11(3), 95-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15

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AMA Style

Gilberto Crispim, Marcus Craig Rodrigs, Luiz Alberton. An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries. J Finance Account. 2023;11(3):95-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15,
  author = {Gilberto Crispim and Marcus Craig Rodrigs and Luiz Alberton},
  title = {An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries},
  journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
  volume = {11},
  number = {3},
  pages = {95-106},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20231103.15},
  abstract = {Considering the new wave of discussion on the expenses made during electoral periods in democratic governments in specialized literature, in which governments stimulate the economy in election years to prospect votes and stay in power, concentrating greater spending on media actions to influence voters in choosing their vote, this study explores the Political Budget Cycles (PBC) and their contributions during the presidential election period, in the governments of the Americas from 1990 to 2019, with the objective of identifying the impact on spending on education (SU), health (HEA), national security (NS), transportation and communication (TC), as well as on the budget deficit (BD), budget surplus (BS), gross domestic product (GDP), human development index (HDI), and unemployment rate (UR). This was done using the random effects statistical method of tobit regression for pooled panel data on expenditures incurred in the 37 American countries. The results are robust and diverge from other studies, as also show that the investigated expenditures do not undergo significant changes in the election period, as suggested by other studies, and that the presence of Political Budget Cycles in democratic countries contributes positively to the economic and human development of these countries located in the Americas.},
 year = {2023}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - An Investigation About Political Budget Cycle in the Electoral Period in American Countries
AU  - Gilberto Crispim
AU  - Marcus Craig Rodrigs
AU  - Luiz Alberton
Y1  - 2023/06/27
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15
DO  - 10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15
T2  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JF  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JO  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
SP  - 95
EP  - 106
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7323
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20231103.15
AB  - Considering the new wave of discussion on the expenses made during electoral periods in democratic governments in specialized literature, in which governments stimulate the economy in election years to prospect votes and stay in power, concentrating greater spending on media actions to influence voters in choosing their vote, this study explores the Political Budget Cycles (PBC) and their contributions during the presidential election period, in the governments of the Americas from 1990 to 2019, with the objective of identifying the impact on spending on education (SU), health (HEA), national security (NS), transportation and communication (TC), as well as on the budget deficit (BD), budget surplus (BS), gross domestic product (GDP), human development index (HDI), and unemployment rate (UR). This was done using the random effects statistical method of tobit regression for pooled panel data on expenditures incurred in the 37 American countries. The results are robust and diverge from other studies, as also show that the investigated expenditures do not undergo significant changes in the election period, as suggested by other studies, and that the presence of Political Budget Cycles in democratic countries contributes positively to the economic and human development of these countries located in the Americas.
VL  - 11
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download